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THESIS

COUNTER-LEADERSHIP TARGETING AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

by

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The question of targeting opponent leadership historically has focused on tactical and moral/legal issues. Can the leader be found? And, is it legal and ethical to attack the leader? Analysis rarely has been conducted to determine whether the targeted organization is vulnerable to Counter-Leadership Targeting (CLT) or what effect the CLT is intended to accomplish.

Organizations vary in their vulnerability to CLT. Conversely, every CLT differs in its collateral effects or unintended consequences. This hampers the targeting organization's ability to leverage the CLT's results. The failure to systematically analyze CLT's effects on the targeted and targeting organizations has resulted in confused policy and failed CLT attempts.

This thesis explores the effects of Counter-Leadership Targeting on conflict termination. Organizational theory is used to develop a model of structural and psychological variables that can be applied to the analysis of a broad range of state and sub-state systems to determine the vulnerability of a specific organization to CLT.

The thesis concludes that future threats to U.S. interests may have organizational characteristics that are conducive to CLT. Thus, the strategy may facilitate conflict termination, but, due to the volatile nature of CLT, it should be deliberately incorporated into a campaign plan only after careful, systematic analysis of the target organization. Initiating such a strategy without systematic analysis could lead to an overly risky venture with potentially high negative effects.

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
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
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I. INTRODUCTION

"A strategic entity - a state, a business organization, a terrorist organization - has...at the center...a human being who gives direction and meaning. The ones who provide this direction are leaders. They, the leaders, are at the strategic center, and in strategic warfare must be the figurative, and sometimes the literal, target of our every action."¹ Throughout recorded history armies have used the strategy of targeting opponent leaders with varying degrees of success. The U.S. has attempted it throughout the spectrum of conflict, from Counter Power targeting for nuclear deterrence during the cold war to the Phoenix Project during Vietnam.

While attacking the C2 structure of an opponent through targeting the organization's leadership has long been seen as a valuable strategy for conflict termination, the type of gains to be made with such an attack has rarely been analyzed prior to proceeding. Generally, the purpose of such an attack has been subsumed by the tactical question of finding the leader, or by the moral question of whether the attack is justified. Rarely has the question been asked as to why the attack is being perpetrated in the first place; what are the desired results? In addition, the targeted

leader's organization is rarely analyzed to determine if the attack is likely to produce those results. This thesis first analyzes the reasons for counter-leadership attacks as well as the risks assumed by such targeting. The thesis then applies organizational theory in an attempt to determine what structural and psychological aspects make an organization more or less susceptible to a strategy of Counter Leadership Targeting. The thesis develops a model that describes how vulnerable an organization is to leadership attacks.

For this thesis, Counter Leadership Targeting (CLT) is defined as the removal of a selected leadership's ability to affect a given conflict. Conflict is further defined as any competition between two organizations, states or sub-states, characterized by overt armed force or its threatened use. While understood that this definition could be taken to extremes (the armed forces exist, thus the threat is always there under all circumstances, etc.), it is meant to encompass the spectrum of conflict ranging from operations other than war to a nuclear exchange where the armed forces are a visible, inherent part of the conflict.

A. LEADERSHIP

Before an analysis of CLT, it is necessary to clarify the term "leader". There are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are people who wear the label. The definitions can be split along two lines: behavioral or positional. Behavioral theorists emphasize characteristics within the person. For example, according to James MacGregor Burns, "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers".² John Gardener writes that "leadership is the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers"³

While behavioral theorists distinguish between leadership and simple power holders,⁴ a positional view emphasizes the identified leadership post, regardless of the behavioral characteristics of the person in that post. In his book *World Leaders*, Jean Blondell describes the chief executive, or leader, of a state as "...[the] one who is in charge of the overall view of the affairs of the government."⁵ Thus, a positional view defines the CEO of a

corporation as the leader, regardless of who holds that position, while a behavioral view focuses on behaviors and characteristics of the individual, regardless of position, before labeling him as a leader.

This thesis combines the positional and behavioral approaches by defining the leadership of an organization as the element that possesses the power to provide the vision for an organization, the direction for obtaining that vision, and the necessary motivation.⁶ This power may come externally from the resources allocated for the labeled leadership position of an organization (such as totalitarian secret police), or internally from the inherent behavioral characteristics of a person (such as Dr. Martin Luther King).

This definition is not concerned with the genesis of the power, either positional or behavioral. It is what Mintzberg succinctly termed as the "Strategic Apex"; "...[T]he person or persons charged with overall responsibility for the organization (whether called president, superintendent, or pope), and any other top-level managers whose concerns are global."⁷ Note that the Strategic Apex is not necessarily a single individual, nor is it necessarily located at the positional apex of the organization. For instance, in a given country, such as Britain, a monarch

could be in the formal position of leader of the state (the positional apex), but the prime minister might function as the actual strategic apex due to the his behavioral leadership characteristics. Thus, the monarch's removal would "...in no way alter the real locus of power within that ...parliamentary order."⁸

Thus, in this analysis leadership is defined by its actual power within the organization, and not necessarily by its position or leadership abilities. This definition is driven more by the followers' perceptions than by the leader. They must view the strategic apex as comprising the leadership of the organization, or the apex will cease to exist as such. The followers grant power to the strategic apex, either freely or through obedience to coercion. In the end, as Lord and Maher state, the strategic apex is simply defined by "the process of being perceived as the leader."⁹

This is the first crucial distinction for an effective strategy of CLT. The targeted leader must be within the actual strategic apex of the organization. It doesn't matter whether that individual is in the labeled position of organizational leader, or whether he/she demonstrates behavioral leadership characteristics; it only matters that the person is regarded by those within the organization as

the one actually providing the vision, direction, and motivation of the organization itself. In *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, Edward Luttwak simplifies this distinction by defining three broad categories of systems: (a) the "presidential type" where the head of state is also the main decision-maker; (b) the "prime ministerial" type, where the head of state has largely symbolic or ceremonial duties and real decision-making is carried out at a theoretically lower level; and, (c) the "strong man" type, where the leader may not hold a formal position at all, but rule by using the formal body of politicians as a screen, indirectly manipulating the official leaders by force.¹⁰

The determination of where the strategic apex is located at a given time can be difficult. The old Soviet Union provides a good example, as the question of what constituted the highest office of the state was sometimes in dispute. This hierarchical lack of definition was in line with Marxist theory, where "the very notion of a supreme office was suspect."¹¹

The problem of identifying the strategic apex is compounded in a sub-state organization. The organization usually contains no labeled leadership positions, and is secretive in nature. In addition, sub-state organizations tend to split apart, change names, or join other existing

organizations. At one minute the sub-state phenomenon could be three different organizations, at another only one. For example, during the 1970's El Salvador had five different insurgent organizations operating within its borders. In early 1980 these organizations joined together to form the FMLN.¹² These aspects of the sub-state group may preclude determining the sub-state strategic apex with any degree of certainty.

B. SCOPE OF THESIS

The intent of this thesis is to analyze how CLT affects conflict termination. Therefore, assassination attempts between organizations during relative peace, such as the U.S. attempts on Castro, are not addressed. Such attempts, however, are used for analytical purposes. On the surface, omitting peacetime assassination attempts appears to exclude an important facet of CLT study, but in actuality the tactical application of CLT encompasses more than simply killing a given leader.

CLT can be accomplished in one of three ways:

- Destruction of the targeted leader
- Capturing the targeted leader
- Isolating the targeted leader from the led

Each method presents a tradeoff in costs and benefits. For instance, while capturing a leader may create a situation in which the targeted organization is stymied over the problem of succession, capture may also be much harder to accomplish. In the same case, killing the leader, while easier, may actually allow a quick succession and provide little leverage as a result.

Initially, in order to simplify the analysis to a manageable scope, the thesis restricts CLT to one form only; destruction. This was chosen primarily because physical attack on an opponent leadership usually has the greatest ramifications. After developing the model using destruction, the thesis applies this model to both the capture and isolation forms of CLT.

The model focuses on the leader in power at the time of the CLT. As such, it does not take into account the ability of the succeeding leader. The replacement leader is assumed to have the same abilities as the targeted leader. In reality, the new leader could have greater or lesser abilities. This is done purposely, as predicting successors within such organizations as insurgencies or totalitarian states is inherently difficult. The chain of command is uncertain, making it hard to determine who will ascend to political power in a succession crisis. As Robert Pape

states, the late Soviet Union is a good case in point:
"Brezhnev's actual successor, Yuri Andropov, and his
successor, Konstantin Chernenko, and his successor, Mikhail
Gorbachev, are hardly mentioned, let alone predicted as
future rulers, by the most detailed treatment at the
time."¹³

Finally, the thesis does not address any tactical
concerns of CLT, such as the intelligence required to find
the target or the method of engagement. The thesis is
designed to determine if a certain leader's removal will
achieve the desired results, not if his removal is feasible.

¹ John Warden III, "The Enemy as a System", *Airpower Journal*, 9:1, (Spring, 1995), p 44

² James M. Burns, *Leadership*, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), p 18

³ Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, *Reframing Organizations*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), p 406

⁴ James M. Burns, p 18

⁵ Jean Blondel, *World Leaders*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), p 21

⁶ Bolman and Deal, p 405

⁷ Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), p 13

⁸ Walter H. Slack, *The Grim Science: The Struggle for Power*, (New York: Kennikat Press, 1981), p 99

⁹ Robert G. Lord and Karen J. Maher, *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p 11

¹⁰ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p 112-113

¹¹ Peter Calvert, "The Theory of Political Succession", in Peter Calvert (ed), *The Process of Political Succession*, (New York: St Martins Press, 1987), p 250

¹² Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, *Guerrilla Warfare*, (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p 408-409

¹³ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p 82

II. INTENT OF CLT

Generally, Counter Leadership Targeting will be attempted by the rational actor for one of two reasons*:

- To cause the dislocation of the opponent organization's ability to function in the prosecution of a conflict by removing the leader of the organization.
- To cause the opponent organization to alter its policy towards a conflict by replacing the leader with one whose objectives are in line with our own.

A CLT strategy of dislocation attempts to remove or hinder the direction of the organization. This strategy is not a means to an end, but rather creates conditions that allow the targeting organization to exploit the target's loss of efficiency and effectiveness in the prosecution of the conflict. Conversely, an intent of replacement strives to alter the vision of the targeted organization and is an end unto itself.

For instance, say Country A invades Country B, a small, weaker state, in order to "reunite the fatherland". Country B would conduct CLT with the intent of replacement if it believed that the successor of Country A had no irredentist feelings and would withdraw his troops from country B given

* By rational, I mean that the targeting is attempted for reasons beyond simple redemption or revenge within a framework that is looking toward future policies or goals. Irrational actors could attempt CLT for any reason, and will not be discussed.

the chance. On the other hand, if Country B believed that the successor had every intent of continuing the campaign, but Country A had highly centralized authority, Country B would conduct CLT with the intent of dislocation, using the loss of efficiency in Country A's organization as leverage to even up the military balance in the conflict.

A. DISLOCATION

As stated, dislocation is not a means to an end, but creates conditions that allow the targeting organization to exploit the target's loss of efficiency in the prosecution of the conflict. It is an application of Command and Control (C2) warfare.

Every element of an organization, from the fighter pilot's tactical application of force to the whole organization's application of strategy, can be viewed as a four-step decision process:

a. First, the leadership conducts observation in order to gather information about the situation that will affect the decision he is seeking to make.

b. Second, the leadership orients on the specifics of the situation in an attempt to assess the "reality" of the operational area. He is trying to determine what information is important, what is superfluous, and to

separate truth from falsehood. The desired end-state is an accurate picture of the situation affecting his decision.

c. Third, the leader makes a decision based on his perception of the situation.

d. Finally, the leader's decision is translated into action, either by himself or, more frequently, by the subordinate units of his organization.¹

A CLT of dislocation is attempting to remove or disrupt the targeted organization's ability to conduct step three, making a decision, in order to disrupt the adversary's ability to react to friendly actions or preempt the adversary's planned actions.² Obviously, in order to be worthwhile, a key component of this strategy is the necessity to force the opponent to execute the four-step decision process in the absence of the targeted leader. If the opponent leadership has predicted your attack strategy prior to the dislocation, and built a "Maginot line" to thwart that strategy, it does no good to remove the leadership and then proceed exactly as he anticipated. In effect, the decision process was accomplished prior to the initiation of hostilities, and thus the targeted organization never felt the loss of the leadership. As Pape notes, "[t]he demands on military communications networks in static warfare are minimal. It is only during rapidly

changing ...operations that command-and -control capabilities are stretched."³ In order to be successful, the dislocation strategy must be tied to an attack strategy that is unexpected and rapidly changing, thus forcing the continued use of the decision process by the opponent in the absence of its leadership.

Dislocation can be conducted to achieve long-term or short-term effects. Long-term effects attempt to degrade the ability of the organization to conduct decision-making throughout the duration of a conflict, either by removing a leader with specific strategic abilities or destroying the organization's ability to transmit decisions for action. Long-term effects do not focus on disrupting specific operations, but on disrupting the decision-making for the duration of the conflict.

An example of the strategy of long-term disruption was the decision to kill Admiral Yamamoto during World War II. As the commander of all Japanese naval forces and the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. forces saw him as a strategic genius.⁴ The U.S. high command believed his removal would have a long-term impact on the Japanese Navy's ability to make innovative strategic decisions. Thus, when intelligence fell into U.S. hands delineating Yamamoto's itinerary for a morale visit to various Pacific islands, the

U.S. launched a fighter group to intercept his plane. On April 18, 1943 his plane was shot down over Bougainville Island.⁵ Whether the CLT of Yamamoto had the desired effect is open to speculation. Some historians state that the Japanese navy received a blow "as severely as if one of its superbattleships had been sunk - a loss that was all the more keenly felt because [the Japanese Navy] had been robbed of their leading naval strategist".⁶ Others argue that Yamamoto's strategy was already bankrupt, and that he was on the run after the Battles for Midway and Guadalcanal. Thus his death meant little to the actual outcome of the war.⁷

A successful example of a long-term approach occurred during the Vietnam War with the so-called Phoenix Project. This was a CIA run program designed to "neutralize" the infrastructure of the Viet Cong by targeting its leadership. This was accomplished either by: (a) getting the target to turn to the government side; (b) arresting the target; or (c) killing the target.⁸ These actions were designed to hinder the ability of the insurgent group to function. To that end Phoenix was, arguably, one of the most effective operations of the Vietnam War.

Interviews conducted with VCI leadership after the war paint a telling picture of the destruction Phoenix wrought. The former VC minister of justice wrote in his memoirs: "In

some locations...Phoenix was dangerously effective. In Haug Nghia Province, for example,...the [VCI] infrastructure was virtually eliminated."⁹ The Communists' deputy commander of South Vietnam, Gen. Tran Do, described Phoenix as "extremely destructive." Nguyen Co Thach, a senior North Vietnamese diplomat during the war, who later became foreign minister, stated "We had many weaknesses in the South because of Phoenix. In some provinces, 95 percent of the communist cadre had been assassinated or compromised by the Phoenix operation."¹⁰ He further stated that Phoenix had "wiped out many of our bases."¹¹

A final example of long-term dislocation, and perhaps one of the most successful, occurred in the 12th century during the Crusades. The leader of the Christian forces, Conrad of Montferat, was killed by the cult of the assassins, creating a blow "from which the Christian forces never recovered, and as a result of his murder a perfect chance to recapture Jerusalem was lost."¹²

A short-term dislocation strategy is used to preempt or create favorable conditions for a specific operation. It does not look at the over-all conflict, but at affecting specific operations within that conflict. A key element is to conduct the CLT as near to the actual operation as possible. Killing, capturing, or isolating the leadership

too far before the planned action may allow the opponent to sufficiently recover, enabling him to use the decision cycle.

This mis-application of the short-term strategy is one criticism of the Instant Thunder air campaign during Desert Storm. One of the primary target sets of the campaign was the political-military leadership and its C2 nodes. According to the mission statement given by Gen. Swarzkopf, the objective of the air attacks on these targets was to "neutralize the Iraqi National Command Authority."¹³ If successful, this would have forced the Iraqi military to fight without direction or control from above, giving the Coalition leverage in the conflict. However, by "attacking Iraqi communications at the beginning of the air war, the Coalition merely gave Saddam Hussein thirty-nine days to repair, work around, or substitute for damaged communications."¹⁴

By contrast, an example of a successful short-term strategy occurred during the Rhodesian insurgency. From 1965 to 1980 Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, combated an insurgency composed of groups opposed to a government of white rule. In April of 1978, in an effort to quell the insurgency, Rhodesia planned one man - one vote elections, and began to prepare for black majority rule. The insurgent groups

claimed the black candidates were puppets and swore not to abide by the elections.¹⁵ The leader of one group, Joshua Nkomo, decided to forgo the insurgency approach and prepared to conduct a full-scale invasion of Rhodesia from neighboring Mozambique in a lightning attack. He felt that if he could gain control before the elections, he would be internationally recognized as the head of the new government of Rhodesia.¹⁶

To preempt this invasion, the Rhodesian Special Air Service conducted Operation Bastille, a cross-border raid against Nkomo's base camp deep in the heart of Mozambique, with the intent of killing Nkomo. On April 12, 1978, five days before the scheduled elections, the raid force attacked Nkomo's residence. Nkomo managed to escape, but the raid served its purpose. The shock of the attack and the near miss on his life disrupted Nkomo's plans. The invasion never materialized and the elections were held as planned.¹⁷

One of the most analyzed dislocation strategies was the U.S. nuclear strategy against the USSR. Shortly after taking office, President Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy". PD 59 advocated targeting the political-military leadership of the Soviet Union in addition to previous target sets. Proponents argued that destroying the political leadership

would prevent a return salvo, that the underlings would be prevented from firing because they would not receive the orders.¹⁸ Opponents argued the opposite: removing the political-military leadership would not stop the nuclear exchange, but would instead lead to a Soviet nuclear force with no control and a runaway exchange. In effect, there would be no one left with whom to discuss terminating the war, and thus the war would continue until either the U.S. or the Soviet Union was completely destroyed.¹⁹

This dilemma defines a key risk of the dislocation strategy: the effects on war termination. As shown, the dislocation strategy is used to facilitate future operations, but the goal of all conflicts is to terminate hostilities favorably with the least amount of sacrifice. Will CLT enhance the ability to terminate hostilities, or lead to a situation where all forces must be destroyed in turn because there is no one with whom to negotiate a surrender? Had we been successful in killing Saddam Hussein, would an order telling Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait have materialized, or would we have had to continue operations until all Iraqi elements had been neutralized? While ultimately remaining a judgment call, the effect of CLT on war termination should be closely

studied in order to allow an accurate assessment of the risks and benefits.

Post-peace events should be analyzed as well. This lack of analysis is distinctly shown in the Gulf War. One of the key reasons given for not driving on to Baghdad was that removing Saddam Hussein would leave a power vacuum in the Middle East, and this vacuum might "Lebanonize Iraq by dicing the country into warring duchies under the sway of Iran, Turkey, or Syria",²⁰ and yet we followed contradictory policy by trying to kill him up to the final days of the ground war.²¹

Post-peace repercussions were addressed with PD 59. In a particularly clairvoyant piece, Colin S. Gray determined that even if the countercommand targeting was successful for U.S. war aims, the removal of the Soviet Union's political infrastructure could lead to dismemberment of the U.S.S.R; and a post-peace region "condemned to interregional war for a long period." This would require "U.S. policing on a truly major scale" and would "constitute a series of scarcely, or non-, viable military and economic entities...racked by civil and international conflicts."²²

B. REPLACEMENT

A strategy of replacement is not employed to disrupt the ability of the organization to make decisions, but to change the decisions overall. It attempts to end the conflict by replacing the belligerent leadership with one that is more agreeable. The targeting organization attempts to alter the actual vision of the targeted organization, and thus a replacement strategy is an end unto itself.

Of the two strategies presented, replacement is the most difficult to accomplish. Success does not ride on the elimination of the current leader, but on the policies of the successor. These policies, in turn, are influenced by the power-base of the organization. The goals of the overall organization will drive the successor's vision. Thus, there must not only be a replacement leader whose views coincide with the targeting organization, but the power base of the target must feel that the replacement is the legitimate head of the organization and worthy of following. Whenever one leader succeeds another, he immediately faces a "crisis of legitimacy." Until he can consolidate his own power base, he will be working with the power base of the old leader. If the old power base is still viewed as the legitimate vision of the organization, he will have to conform to its views in order to remain in

power.²³ "[T]he vast majority of the state officials and population must not have a strong interest in opposing the new ruling elite. Any group seizing power which does not have the loyalty of other ruling elites [will] be quickly replaced by legitimate political authority."²⁴ Thus, in order to succeed, the targeting organization must know that there is a replacement leader with a vision that conforms to its own; that the replacement will in fact assume the position of leader; and that the replacement will have the ability to execute the new vision once in the leadership position.

There are two primary reasons why such a situation will not exist. First, it is unlikely that the replacement leader will have a vision that is different from that of the previous leader. If the organization was opposed to the vision of the previous leader, chances are the conflict would not be occurring in the first place. The previous leader already would have altered his vision to conform to the organization.

Second, even if the successor espouses a new vision, he would find it difficult to execute because of opposition from within the organization. He would have to conform to the old vision to ensure his survival in the leadership position, at least in the short term.

For a replacement strategy to work, there must exist a substantive difference between the vision and policies espoused by the targeted leader, and the vision and policies espoused by the dominant coalition of the organization. This situation rarely exists in an actual organization.

Because of this rarity, very few assassinations actually accomplish their intended purpose. While removing the current leader appears to solve the perceived "problem," in actuality the assassin is merely attacking the person who is executing the vision of the organization. The history of assassination is replete with examples. Depending on whose conspiracy theory one wants to believe, President Lincoln was killed to prevent the fall of the South or to prevent the reconstruction of the South. Either way, the act was a dismal failure.²⁵ In 1981 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was killed by Islamic fundamentalists in an attempt to spark a religious revolution much like the fundamentalist revolution in Iran. The exact opposite occurred. Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, ruthlessly cracked down on all Islamic extremists, purging them from the country.²⁶ Finally, in 1984 the Prime Minister of India, Indira Ghandi, was killed by Sikhs to thwart her attempts to prevent the creation of a Sikh state. However, far from enhancing the move for Sikh separatism, her assassination precipitated the deaths of

some three thousand Sikhs at the hands of mobs in eighty cities, and the stability of a united India was more assured than ever. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, succeeded her as Prime Minister in an overwhelming victory during a general election, thereby ensuring that her policies would continue.²⁷

The closer the vision of the targeted organization coincides with that of the targeting organization, the greater the chance the replacement CLT will succeed.

For instance, during an insurgency in Mexico in the early 1900's, Emiliano Zapata, the leader of the insurgency, staunchly refused to compromise with the Mexican authorities. Zapata's leadership was seen as the principal impediment to negotiation and peace. Within months of his assassination in April 1919, his movement joined forces with moderates and gained political power in the government.²⁸

In the modern world nothing illustrates this phenomenon greater than the killing of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Rabin was working diligently toward a solution to the problem of Palestine and the Palestinian people, and he was slowly granting them autonomy in the West Bank by ceding them land. However, much of the Israeli population opposed giving any land to the Palestinians in exchange for peace. Rabin's assassin decided that removing

Rabin would stop this process.²⁹ His act accomplished what it intended as it cleared the way for the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, an outspoken critic of Rabin's policies, and a man opposed to "land for peace" options.

The United States was aware of these potential organizational problems when it conducted a replacement CLT on Manuel Noriega during Operation Just Cause. At the time of Just Cause, the power base of Noriega, and thus Panama, was the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), not the people.³⁰ The purpose of the invasion of Panama was to restore democracy by replacing Noriega. Realizing that simply replacing Noriega with someone else would not solve the problem, as the PDF would ensure that the successor's vision conformed to its own, the U.S. invaded and removed the PDF from the equation, thereby creating a new power base centered on the people.³¹

Because of this need for a division between the visions/policies of the organization and the visions/policies of the organizational leadership, most sub-state organizations, such as specific terrorist groups, are poor candidates for replacement CLT. Since the sub-state organization exists to counter the state, it is unlikely, if not impossible, to have a successor who alters the vision of the organization. To do so would entail destroying the

organization's reason for existence, and thus the organization will not allow it.

1. Deterrence and Coercion: Two Special Cases of Replacement

A special category of replacement is that of deterrence or coercion. Here the actual leader, or his successor, alters the vision of the organization primarily because of the threat of CLT. This was, arguably, the purpose of Operation Eldorado Canyon against Qaddafi in 1986. In this operation the U.S. launched an air strike against Libya with the intent of stopping Libyan state sponsored terrorism. Although never overtly stated, the target set included Qaddafi, the Libyan head of state.³²

In this strategy, the more the regime values its existence over the behavior in question, the easier it will be to deter or coerce. In other words, the more the costs incurred for continuing the present behavior outweigh the benefits to be gained, the easier it will be to accomplish deterrence or coercion. Thus, attacking the regime of a state, such as Libya, to stop the support of terrorism should be easier to accomplish than attacking it in order to stop the sale of oil. This was, once again, one of the reasons for the implementation of PD 59. Directly targeting the Soviet political infrastructure would threaten "the

Soviet regime in a way that killing civilians or destroying industry [would] not."³³ The behavior in question, that of a Soviet first strike, would be altered because the Soviets valued their regime more than the destruction of the United States.

It should be remembered that the perceived costs of non-compliance can be greater than the economic or military cost/benefit calculation of the altered behavior, and could include behavioral factors such as a fear of looking weak to its own, as well as outside, organizations.³⁴ These behavioral costs can outweigh other aspects to the point where the leadership appears to be acting irrationally in the face of overwhelming military might.

The organizations most susceptible to deterrence or coercion from CLT are probably third world totalitarian dictatorships.

[T]he most powerful determinant of the behavior of Third World Leaders is a rational calculation of how to ensure their political and physical survival. Instead of pursuing policy which will benefit the state, a Third World Leader will make policy decisions based on how a policy will affect his probability of remaining in power.³⁵

Thus, a CLT threat viewed as credible by a Third World Leader may have more of a deterrent or coercive capability than a threat of military force directed against the regimes military power or against other assets within the country,

such as its economy or civilian population.³⁶ When the leadership is given a choice of "endangering its hold on power, or endangering the state itself, it will inevitably choose the latter."³⁷

On the other hand, deterring a sub-state organization is much harder to accomplish. Since most sub-state organizations exist solely to counter the state, trying to deter this behavior, like attempting replacement, affects their reason for existence. Even if the leader wanted to alter the group's behavior, the members would not allow it. If he attempts to alter the vision of the organization, his own people will remove him.

Whether deterring the current leader or his replacement, the new vision of the targeted organization will only last as long as the threat against it is credible. This credibility depends upon the target believing that the organization issuing the threat has: (a) the military capabilities sufficient to carry out the specific threat; and (b) the will or intention to use those capabilities.³⁸ In the case of Eldorado Canyon, Qaddafi did stop sponsoring terrorism for roughly twelve months. Eventually, Qaddafi felt that the threat from the United States had dissipated, and "Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans returned to

their typical level of one or two a year", including the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103.³⁹

C. CONCLUSION

Before considering a counter-leadership strategy, the intent to be accomplished should be addressed. It is impossible to determine a military strategy without knowing the purpose to be accomplished. As we have seen, too often a contradictory policy is espoused, such as the policy of targeting Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. At the extreme, other CLT attempts have been conducted with no clear purpose at all, with disastrous consequences.

In 1993 a U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia (UNISOM II) became engaged in a conflict with Mohamed Aidid, the leader of a Somali clan called the SNA. The conflict reached a boiling point on 5 June 1993, when twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were killed attempting to inspect a weapons storage site controlled by the SNA. The U.N. promptly passed resolution 837, which condemned the killings and authorized UNOSOM II to take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the act, including the "arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."⁴⁰ A subsequent investigation by the U.N. implicated Aidid as having instigated the attack.⁴¹

On 22 August 1993 President Clinton ordered Task Force Ranger, a composite task force of special operations personnel, to deploy and capture Aidid and his top lieutenants.⁴² After six attempts, some of which were successful in capturing important members of the SNA hierarchy, the mission culminated on 3-4 October 1993 in the largest firefight since the Vietnam War. When it was over, the battle left 18 Americans dead and created enough backlash within the U.S. public for President Clinton to announce the total withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Somalia.⁴³ In the end, Aidid, the man we had tried so hard to remove, was transported by U.S. aircraft to Addis Ababa for reconciliation talks. The Somalis viewed him as the David who had withstood the United States' Goliath, his official status "transformed from criminal to embattled statesman."⁴⁴

While tactically Task Force Ranger executed its mission with precision (including the 3-4 October firefight where the task force successfully conducted a breakout from the encirclement of the SNA militia against odds nearing ten to one), strategically the intent of the CLT attempts at Aidid are hard to decipher. Then Secretary-General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued that

If the United Nations did not respond, a dangerous precedent would be set. The signal would go out to other conflict areas of the world that attacks on United Nations personnel could be carried out with impunity.⁴⁵

In effect, he was attempting a strategy of deterrence against some future unknown opponent. On the other hand, the U.N. command within Somalia was unsure of exactly what the intent was, and settled for a curious blend of dislocation and replacement. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee the Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II (and the overall commander of U.S. forces), Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery, first states "If you did...a simple military analysis of where is the center of gravity for the SNA militia, it invariably took you to the person of Aidid. And that if Aidid is removed from the scene...the SNA militia would have a hard time continuing to conduct operations."⁴⁶ Later, during the same testimony, he states "[after Aidid's removal] other leaders would come to the fore. The U.N. politically kept its hand out to the clan of General Aidid...they were talking to certain elders of the clan and some of the subclans."⁴⁷

This lack of consensus about the intent of CLT is indicative of the lack of analysis applied to the entire policy of Somali operations. This led to disastrous results that had repercussions beyond the conflict in Somalia. The

CLT attempt on Aidid, far from deterring other would-be belligerents from harming U.N. personnel, deterred the U.N. from using CLT in future conflicts where the strategy had the potential to provide greater benefits than would have been realized in Somalia. In July of 1995, Bosnian Serbs systematically slaughtered an estimated 7,000 Muslims in the town of Srebrenica. Two men were primarily responsible for the massacre and for subsequent war crimes. When news of the massacre began to appear, the U.S., as well as the U.N., refused to consider a strategy of CLT against these leaders for fear of crossing the "Mogadishu line".⁴⁸

The greater lesson to be learned from this example is that Counter Leadership Targeting can have effects exponentially larger than the actual operation. Applying CLT haphazardly is risking a failure whose impact can be felt far beyond the immediate conflict.

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² Ibid, p I-7

³ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p 251

⁴ Burke Davis, *Get Yamamoto*, (New York: Random House, 1969), p 8

⁵ R. Cargill Hall, *Lightning Over Bougainville*, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), p 22-24

⁶ John Costello, *The Pacific War*, (New York: Rawson, Wade Publisher, 1981), p 403

⁷ Ewin P. Hoyt, *Japan's War*, (New York: De Capo Press, 1986), p 324-325

⁸ Mark Moyer, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p 47-55.

⁹ Ibid, p 245-246

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ John Prados, *The Hidden History of the Vietnam War*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1995), p 219.

¹² Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1995), p 160-161

- ¹³ Stephen T. Hosmer, *Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1996), p 45
- ¹⁴ Pape, p 251
- ¹⁵ Cole, Barbara, *The Elite; the Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, (Transkei, South Africa: Three Knights Publishing, 1984), p 270
- ¹⁶ Ibid, p 273
- ¹⁷ Ibid, p 276-296
- ¹⁸ Clark C. Abt, *A Strategy for Terminating a Nuclear War*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p 39-41
- ¹⁹ Stephen J. Cimballa, "Countercommand Attacks and War Termination" in Stephen J. Cimballa (ed), *Strategic War Termination*, (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1986), p 141-146
- ²⁰ Rick Atkinson *Crusade; The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993) p 299-300
- ²¹ Ibid, p 473
- ²² Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War", in Ball, Desmond and Richelson, Jeffrey (ed), *Strategic Nuclear Targeting*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p 187-188
- ²³ Peter Calvert, *The Process of Political Succession*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987), p 11-13.
- ²⁴ Pape, p 232
- ²⁵ Linda Laucella, *Assassination: The Politics of Murder*, (Los Angeles: Lowell House, 1998), p 59-70
- ²⁶ Ibid, p 354-372
- ²⁷ Ibid, p 369-375
- ²⁸ Bruce A Ross, "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War", *Naval War College Review*, XLVI:1, Winter 1993, p 77
- ²⁹ Ibid, p 413-441
- ³⁰ Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995), p 416
- ³¹ For a detailed account of the operation, see Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991).
- ³² Roger G. Herbert, *Bullets with Names: The Deadly Dilemma*, (Monterey: NPS Thesis, 1992), p 83-86.
- ³³ Jeffrey Richelson, "The Delemmas of Counterpower Targeting", in Ball and Richelson, p 162
- ³⁴ Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988), p 52
- ³⁵ Herbert, p 84
- ³⁶ Kenneth Watman, *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1995), p 73
- ³⁷ Herbert, p 85
- ³⁸ Huth, p 4
- ³⁹ David Tucker, "Responding to Terrorism", *The Washington Quarterly*, 21:1, 1997, p 111
- ⁴⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, (New York: United Nations Dept. of Public Inf., 1996), p 49-50
- ⁴¹ For the complete text of the investigation, see Ghali, "Document 62", p 296-300.
- ⁴² Patrick J. Sloyan, "Somalia Mission Control; Clinton Called the Shots in Failed Policy Targeting Aidid", *Newsday*, (December 5, 1993)
- ⁴³ For the a detailed account of the battle, see Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999)
- ⁴⁴ Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p 86
- ⁴⁵ Ghali, p 50
- ⁴⁶ Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, *U.S. Military Operations in Somalia - Hearings on 12, 21 May 1994*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p 37
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, p 42
- ⁴⁸ For a complete account of the fall of Srebrenica, see David Rohde, *Endgame*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997). For specific references to CLT see pp 342, 376, 391, and 420 (note 8)

III. LEVERAGE PROVIDED BY CLT

Regardless of the purpose behind the operation, the effect of CLT is a function of the degree of loss in the efficiency of the organization coupled with the length of time this loss remains. Simply put, the greater the effect on the organization due to the loss of the leader, and the longer the effects last, the greater the leverage gained.

The length of time the effect of CLT lasts can be defined as a function of the length of time it takes (a) the organization to provide a successor and (b) the successor to achieve maximum efficiency within the organization. The longer it takes the organization to provide a successor for the previous leader and for the new leader to achieve actual control, the longer the effects of CLT will persist. One variable that will mitigate this is the length of time it takes the actual effects of CLT to be felt by the organization. No organization will lose efficiency immediately upon the loss of the leader, but some organizations will feel the effects more quickly than others. Thus, the longer it takes an organization to feel the effects of CLT, the shorter the overall leverage time, regardless of the absolute time needed for recovery.

Thus, there are four separate variables that define the effects of CLT:

- (a) The length of time before the CLT is felt by the organization
- (b) The level of effect on the loss of efficiency within the organization
- (c) The length of time before the organization provides a successor
- (d) The length of time before the successor achieves maximum efficiency

A hypothetical example is depicted graphically in Figure 1:




Figure 1

Note that the two intents of CLT mentioned previously are the inverse of each other with respect to time. In a dislocation strategy, the longer the effects remain, the

greater the leverage that can be applied against the organization. The strategy is a means to an end.

In a replacement strategy, the shorter the effects remain, the quicker the successor can alter the vision of the organization to conform to the targeting organization. The strategy is an end unto itself.

Organizations will have two distinct reactions to a successful CLT. One is structural, and the other is psychological.

A. STRUCTURAL EFFECTS

The structural analysis focuses on the rational operating mechanisms of the organization. It looks to the established coordinating and control mechanisms of the organization to determine the results of CLT. It is concerned primarily with the pre-existing structure of the targeted organization, rather than such issues as emotional attachments to the targeted leader. The analysis strives to focus on the structural organizational vulnerabilities rather than the psychological effects of human interaction.

1. Effects On The Loss Of Efficiency Within The Organization

The level of effect that the removal of the leader has on the efficiency of the organization is a function of the following variables:

- The size of the strategic apex
- Degree of functional ability of leader
- Degree of vertical decentralization
- Degree of lateral coordination
- Degree of professionalism of the organization

a) *The Size of the Strategic Apex*

Quite probably, the most important attribute for determining the level of effect that CLT will have on a given organization is the size of the strategic apex. Specifically, how many individuals does the strategic apex comprise, and how much of the decision-making ability of the organization is dispersed throughout these individuals? Simply put, the greater the centralization of decision making within a targeted individual at the strategic apex, the greater the effect of CLT. If the strategic apex comprises more than one individual, the organization will have a greater ability to make and execute decisions after CLT.

Jean Blondell describes this as single or shared leadership.¹ At one end of a continuum is the strategic apex consisting of one person with absolute power, such as a pure monarchy and absolute military presidential rule, where "the leader rules alone without any constraints".² Moving towards the other end is the beginnings of a shared

leadership system such as a prime ministerial-monarchy. In such a shared system one person still can be seen as the dominant power wielder, but the power is not absolute. It is distilled through other persons within the strategic apex.³ The United States falls at this point, as the President's ability to implement decisions unilaterally is greatly constrained by the will of the Congress. These elected officials determine much of the vision for the U.S. Continuing to the right are organizations that are led by councils, such as the "weather bureau" for the extremist group the "weathermen" or the Swiss Federal Council of Switzerland, a constitutional council of equals.⁴ Here the persons within the strategic apex are of equal power, which minimizes the loss of any one person. At the other end of the continuum is an organization in which every member has a say in the decision making process, what Mintzberg termed as "power to everyone".⁵ In this case there may be no definable strategic apex. As described in *The Advent of Netwar*, the organization has no

single central leader or commander; the network as a whole...has little to no hierarchy. There may be multiple leaders. Decisionmaking and operations are decentralized and depend on consultative consensus-building...⁶

Organizations of this type are not conducive to CLT, as the target is like the many-headed Hydra. No single person has an impact on the organization overall.

Recognizing the value of a large strategic apex, or no strategic apex at all, some organizations are moving towards this extreme. The Christian Identity Movement has espoused a doctrine of "leaderless resistance", where "all individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction..."⁷ A leader of the movement, Louis Beam, created the idea after other white supremacist groups, such as The Order, were neutralized by the arrest of their strategic apex.⁸

Accordingly, Beam proposed that so-called "phantom cell networks" or "autonomous leadership units" be established that would operate completely independently of one another but, through individual terrorist acts, would eventually join together to create a chain reaction leading to a nationwide white supremacist revolution.⁹

If a single leadership structure is, in fact, "the riskiest of ...configurations, hinging on the health and whims of one individual"¹⁰ then why don't all organizations that have the potential to be involved in conflict move toward a shared leadership system, or no leader system at all, as espoused by the Christian Identity Movement? The answer is that the leadership of an organization is a prime

coordinating mechanism for that organization. The more leaders involved in the decisionmaking process, the more inefficient the organization. During periods of extreme hostility, where the survival of the organization is at stake, an organization will tend to centralize its structure, if only temporarily. This is because a centralized structure is

the fastest and tightest means of coordination--only one brain is involved. All members of the organization know exactly where to send information; no time is wasted in debate; authority for action is clearly defined; one leader makes and coordinates all the decisions.¹¹

Eventually, if they want to become something greater than a nuisance, the Christian Identity Movement will have to begin coordinating their actions as a cohesive group. This involves some form of leadership. "Leaderless rebellion" is not leaderless, but an organization that comprises nothing but leaders. This necessarily involves wasted effort, if not outright conflicts of aims. Imagine one "leader" deciding to blow up a train that is carrying another "leader" to a different target.

Even in the absence of extreme hostility organizations will tend towards a single leadership structure because this is seen as more stable.

Rightly or wrongly..., men believe that a shared top leadership will lead to quarrels, difficulties, confusion, and therefore to instability in [the

organization]. This is felt to be particularly true if the leaders are strong personalities: none of these strong men will lightly agree to see their views defeated; they will fight back and therefore create confusion in [the organization].¹²

Finally, organizations tend to centralize because of power needs of the members. Each member of the organization will tend to seek power within the organization. The strategic apex itself will constantly strive to increase its power over the organization, leading to greater centralization.¹³

b) Degree of Functional Ability of the Leader

While the size of the strategic apex is of great importance in determining the effect on the organization, the leader's ability will tend to enhance the results. The ability of the leader is the target's actual expertise in directing the organization, what Clausewitz called "Military Genius".¹⁴ The leader of any organization has a definable level of expertise. All things being equal, two different persons in the same leadership position will have different abilities. These differences will cause an unequal impact on the organization's ability to function should the leader be removed. For instance, while structurally the position of commander of a U.S. Theater Army during World War II was the same regardless of the theater, removing Gen. Patton

would have had a greater effect than the removal of another commander in the same position due to Patton's exceptional abilities. This was an overriding reason for the mission that killed Admiral Yamamoto during WW II. When possible successors to Yamamoto were analyzed, he was seen as having strategic abilities "head and shoulders above them all."¹⁵ This functional ability has a double impact. Organizations will tend to give power to a leader based on the perceptions of his capabilities. The greater the expertise, the more power the organization will give the leader.¹⁶ Thus, in addition to the loss of the leader's actual ability, a greater vacuum will be created within the strategic apex upon the leader's removal than the removal of someone of lesser ability.

Several structural variables will mitigate the effect of CLT on an organization regardless of the above attributes. These include the level of vertical decentralization, the level of lateral coordination, and the level of professionalism of the organization.

c) *The Level of Vertical Decentralization*

Decentralization is the process of distributing formal authority and power for decision making among the organization.¹⁷ According to Mintzberg it has two specific

variations: vertical decentralization and horizontal decentralization.¹⁸ Vertical decentralization is the key variation when determining the loss of efficiency. Simply put, vertical decentralization is the degree that the strategic apex allows subordinates to decide on the direction of the organization. It is "concerned with the delegation of decision-making power down the chain of authority...from the strategic apex..."¹⁹ Note that this is not the same as expanding the strategic apex. The subordinate elements are delegated the authority for making choices that impact the direction of their components of the organization, but the strategic apex still establishes the vision. The greater the degree of vertical decentralization, the more freedom of action of the subordinate elements, and the less impact CLT will have on the organization. If the leader simply concerns himself with the vision and allows subordinates to completely choose how to obtain that vision, the effect of CLT will be mitigated; the organization is already capable of acting in the absence of the leader. Conversely, if the vision and direction is centralized at the strategic apex, the organization will theoretically come to a standstill with the removal of the leader, as the subordinate elements will

not have the direction from the leadership necessary to continue operations.

A good example of this occurred during Operation Overlord on June 6, 1944. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel commanded the German defenses along the Normandy coast, but did not command the Panzer armored divisions assigned for counter-attack duties. The supreme commander, Adolf Hitler, retained the release authority for the Panzer divisions. The 21st Panzer division first received reports of the invasion at 0130. Within an hour the division was assembled, engines running, standing by for orders to counter-attack. Unfortunately for Rommel, Hitler was sleeping and the high command was afraid to wake him, so no release was forthcoming. Thus, "the division Rommel most counted on to drive the Allies into the sea...was rendered immobile by the intricacies of the leadership principle in the Third Reich."²⁰

Vertical decentralization does not have to occur at the same level across the organization. The strategic apex can decentralize some parts of the organization while maintaining centralized control over others. For instance, a manufacturer can give the assembly line complete control over its actions while not allowing the finance department to make any purchase decisions on its own. This is known as

"selective vertical decentralization"²¹ and can have a huge impact on the intended results of CLT. If the component of the organization that the CLT is intended to affect has been vertically decentralized, CLT will have little structural impact. For instance, in modern times the head of state usually does not directly control the military. This is left to people who have experience in the military arts. Thus, the strategic apex has selectively decentralized military decisions to the military leaders, as President Bush did with Gen. Swarzkopf during the Gulf War. In this situation, if the intent of the CLT were dislocation via the military, the removal of the leader would have little effect, as the military does not look to the strategic apex for direction.

As shown earlier, this is precisely the dilemma proposed by President Carter's Presidential Directive 59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy". Proponents argued that control of the USSR Nuclear forces was so centralized due to necessary fail-safe precautions that taking out the political leadership would prevent a return salvo, that the underlings would be prevented from firing because they would not receive the orders. Opponents argued the opposite: that the firing would be selectively decentralized to military

forces, and attacks on the political targets would be a waste, if not counter productive.²²

Selective decentralization can have an impact on sub-state conflicts as well. Terrorist groups tend to decentralize control over their military wings to allow the political leadership to "publicly disassociate itself when the terrorists commit a particularly outrageous act...".²³ In this type of selective decentralization, the "armed wing tends to become independent; the men and women with guns and bombs often lose sight of the movement's wider aims and may end up doing more harm than good."²⁴ In other words, the armed wing can begin to operate according to its own vision, and thus become a separate organization with a different strategic apex. A CLT on the espoused leadership, regardless of the intent, will not impact the military wing. The military wing itself will have to be targeted.

d) *The Degree of Lateral Coordination*

Tied to vertical decentralization is the degree of lateral coordination used by the organization. Lateral coordination is the process by which elements coordinate their actions directly with each other instead of through the strategic apex.²⁵ Elements within the organization are allowed to coordinate certain actions between each other,

without consulting the strategic apex. The more lateral coordination used, the less of an impact CLT will have, because the organization relies less on the strategic apex for coordination of work. Generally, the more dynamic and unpredictable the environment, the more an organization will rely on lateral coordination.²⁶ As armed conflict is characterized by uncertainty, lateral coordination should be one of the prime coordinating mechanisms used, but this is not always the case. An insurgent organization could allow no lateral coordination between cells due to the security requirements necessary for survival. In this case, all coordination would be vertical, through the strategic apex.

e) *The Degree of Professionalism of the Organization*

Finally, the degree of professionalism within the organization will impact on CLT's level of effect. "The more able, trained and knowledgeable subordinates are, the less they must rely upon sources of information external to themselves."²⁷ Thus, the more professional the members of an organization are, the less they rely on the strategic apex for information necessary to execute their duties. In addition, professionals "identify strongly with their chosen professions...They are often more strongly committed to their professional subcultures than to their employing

organization."²⁸ Thus, all things being equal, the greater the professional orientation of the organization, the less effect the removal of the organizational leadership will have on that organization.

2. Length Of Time Before The Effects Are Felt Within The Organization

The structural effects of CLT are not felt by the organization immediately, but build over time. This time lag is a function of the following variables of the organization:

- The level of vertical differentiation
- The frequency of communication

a) Level of Vertical Differentiation

Vertical differentiation describes the number of levels within the hierarchy of the organization. The more levels, the longer communication flows will take to go from the strategic apex to the operating core of the organization,²⁹ and the longer it will take for CLT to impact the organization. Generally, the larger the organization targeted, the more vertical differentiation it will have, and the longer the length of time before the effects of CLT will be felt. This is not an absolute rule. For instance, an organization of thirteen persons with a span of control of three will have the same vertical

differentiation as an organization of seven persons and a span of control of two:




Figure 2

All things being equal, the operating core of both of these organizations will feel the effects of CLT at the same time, despite the differences in size. This assumes that each component of a given level will receive the information about the CLT at the same time. The element of size will take on greater importance if the hierarchy must communicate with each of the components of a given level separately.

b) The Frequency of Communication

Coupled with organizational size is the frequency of communication used by the organization. The more frequent the communication between components of the organization, the quicker the effects will be felt. In a hostile, dynamic environment all organizations will attempt to develop a rapid communication capability in order to

survive.³⁰ While business organizations compete within the marketplace, organizations engaged in armed conflict are attempting to destroy each other directly. This tends to restrict rapid communications because of the need for secrecy. The more one communicates within an organization, the more chances the opposition has to intercept those communications, and the greater the ability the opponent has to affect future planned actions. Thus, the need for frequent communication is tempered by the need for the security of the organization's communications. The more security required, the less the organization will communicate between its separate components, and the longer the time lag between CLT and its effects on the organization. This is seen in its most extreme form during sub-state conflict, where the need for security sometimes exceeds the need for anything else in order to survive.

3. Length Of Time Before The Organization Provides A Successor

The longer it takes an organization to provide a successor for the targeted leader, the longer the effect of CLT will persist. Organizations operating with an interim or acting leader tend to adopt a one-day -at-a-time attitude.

Time horizons shorten dramatically; participants become increasingly unable to commit to long-term

projects that may go nowhere if the new leader changes direction...Because an acting leader is not viewed as having the authority to resolve strategic questions, the organization shifts into routine gear.³¹

The quickest way to mitigate this state is to fill the vacuum at the strategic apex. The following structural aspects of the organization will affect the organization's ability to accomplish this:

- The degree that the succession policy is institutionalized
- The level of unity within the organization's power base
- The exclusiveness of the requirements the leadership position demands

a) *The Degree that the Succession Policy is Institutionalized*

The degree that the organization has institutionalized the policy of succession prior to the targeting provides a key indicator of how rapidly a successor can be installed. This institutionalization can range from: (a) having a known, named successor; (b) an institutionalized policy providing for succession, without an actual named successor; (c) no policy whatsoever, with unclear or unspecified terms for succession, and a vague chain of command beneath the strategic apex. The less the policies for succession are institutionalized, the longer the process will take. Remember, the concern is not with a

formal, regular succession policy, but with the policy for the unanticipated removal of leadership within the strategic apex. Even organizations with rigid procedures for succession, such as the United States, face a degree of turmoil should the strategic apex be removed outside of the normal succession process.

The orderly transition on the assassination of John F. Kennedy was not in fact as orderly as it was made to seem to the outside world, but compared with the chaos that followed the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1981 it was a model. Vice President Bush displayed the usual reluctance of Vice Presidents to be seen to grasp for power too eagerly. Secretary of State Al Haig declared that he was in charge when he plainly was not.³²

The further the organization moves away from an institutionalized succession policy, the greater the turmoil the organization will have when replacing the strategic apex.

If institutionalized succession enhances the survivability of the organization, why would the strategic apex choose not to set a succession policy? The answer lies within the strategic apex itself. As shown with deterrence, the leadership of some organizations, such as totalitarian dictatorships, are more concerned with holding the power they have than with the survival of the organization overall. For them, the loss of power equates to the end of their organization. Whatever happens after their period of

rule is irrelevant. In these regimes there tends not to be a named successor, for such a position equates to a "crown prince" who will someday assume their leadership mantle within the strategic apex, quite possibly by force. If there is a successor, he or she usually does not last long or is politically non-threatening. This was the case in China,

To be number two...under Mao was an ill-fated occupation. President Liu Shaochi was purged in 1966 and died in jail, and his successor...Lin Biao lasted only five years. The wily Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, knew the secret for survival - remain forever happily number three.³³

Sub-state actors might not designate a successor simply because they feel that there is no person capable of replacing the current leader. Insurgencies generally spring from the vision of one man. If successful in creating an organization, he becomes the strategic apex. Initially, for all practical purposes, he is the insurgency. As the organization grows, its loyalty is bound to the "infallible" leader. To name a successor would imply that the leader will someday fall, and that he can in fact be replaced. Instead, members of the organization may feel that if the strategic apex is removed, it is doomed. Thus, there is no need for a successor.

b) The Level of Unity Within the Organization's Power Base

Most organizations cannot be characterized as unitary actors. Instead, they are a "composite of many players, individuals and bureaucracies, with frequently divergent interests, varying scopes of concern, and differing degrees of power."³⁴ These different actors within the organization compete with one another on everything from the day to day functioning of the organization to the making of major policy decisions. As Graham Allison states,

...government decisions and actions result from a political process. In this process, sometimes one group committed to a course of action triumphs over other groups fighting for other alternatives...what moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons that support a cause of action, or the routines or organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.³⁵

This competitive tendency can affect the succession process. The further an organization moves away from institutionalized succession, the more the succession policy is replaced by the relative strength of those contending for power. "As a result, succession conflicts have to be solved by elite infighting, which necessitates the cultivation of power bases from which to start attacks and on which to fall back for political security."³⁶ In this

case the degree of unity within the organization will govern the speed of succession. An organization that contains multiple factions at odds with each other (either formally in the sense of political parties or informally in the sense of power bases within the organization) will take longer to agree on a successor than an organization united in its vision. Each faction will tend toward ensuring its survival by fighting for a successor who is favorably disposed to its views. The more opposed the factions, and the more equal in strength, the harder it will be for the organization to provide a successor that meets the requirements of all concerned.

In certain "institutionalized succession" cases this organizational power struggle will still occur, as the named successor will only fill the formal role of leader rather than a position within the strategic apex. For instance, a monarch acting within the strategic apex while alive could be replaced by his six-year-old son upon his death. While the position of formal leader has been filled, the question of successor within the strategic apex remains. Another example would be a successor who was chosen precisely because he was weak and of little threat to the current leader.³⁷ He, too, would only fill the role of formal leader and would quite possibly be removed shortly

after assuming the role. In both of these cases the succession process would appear smooth, but the actual power struggle for the strategic apex would continue, probably ending in Luttwak's "strong man" form of leadership.

c) The Exclusiveness of the Requirements the Leadership Position Demands

Contributing to the delay in replacing the leader are the organizational requirements that must be met by the leader prior to being considered for the position. Some organizations may require the leader to be the first born son of a monarch, a religious clergyman, have certain prior work experience, or simply be of a certain age. Combined with the formal requirements are informal stipulations that reduce the pool of candidates even further. For instance, while the formal requirements for the President of the United States are relatively small,

there [are] additional requirements which [are] not formally necessary, but which the practice of American politics seemed to confirm [have] equal force...[such as race, gender, prior experience, etc.]... whatever the population of the United States might be, not more than 200 people at any one time [have] any chance of becoming president, at most five or six might be seriously considered...³⁸

The more exclusive the prerequisites for the position of leader, the greater the length of the time to find a replacement, provided the replacement has not been

named prior to the CLT. If the organization has an institutionalized, named successor for the strategic apex (not simply the position), the requirements have presumably already been met, and thus will not cause a delay in succession.

4. Length Of Time Before The Successor Achieves Maximum Efficiency

The effect of CLT does not cease immediately upon the successor assuming the role of leader. In every organization the new leader will face an initial crisis of legitimacy. He will have to prove to the organization that he is a capable replacement. Upon assuming the position, the new leader will be working towards consolidating and solidifying his position as leader until this legitimacy fight is over. "At this time it will be a prime aim of the [leader] to ensure that no effective challenge to his or her primacy has the opportunity to manifest itself."³⁹

During this transition period, the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization will take a backseat to the survival of the position. If the leader cannot consolidate his position, the organization will have a succession crisis, with one individual after another in the position until stability is achieved. A prime example of this is the Dominican crisis of 1962-1966, when a total of

eight presidents assumed the position of the strategic apex in a four-year period.⁴⁰

The length of time needed by the successor to achieve maximum efficiency in the leadership position is a function of the following variables:

- The level of unity within the organization's power base
- The degree of Horizontal Decentralization
- The frequency of communication

a) *The Level of Unity within the Organization's Power Base*

Like the successor fight, the unity of the organization is instrumental in determining how long it will take the leader to assume maximum efficiency. If the new leader has a single, solid powerbase to with which to work, his legitimacy fight will be swift. If, on the other hand, he is contending with factions who are disgruntled about his selection, he will have to fight to ensure his survival. The other factions will attempt to discredit his work, if not overtly try to destroy it.

Within all organizations resides a formal and informal base of power:

Formal power...is the power that automatically accompanies certain ranks and posts in the [organization], and whose bonds of loyalty are easily passed on to the next occupant, and

informal power, which consists of the long-term, diffuse, and relatively disinterested alliances that an actor collects along his recruitment path into the central decision-making area.⁴¹

In this contest, the informal power base of the factions becomes paramount. The formal requirements for legitimate authority of the organization presumably have already been met, because by definition the successor would not have assumed the position if he did not meet the formal requirements necessary for the post. This leaves an informal struggle for control of the strategic apex, and ultimately the organization.

Factions opposed to the choice of successor will attempt to generate support against the successor by criticizing his policies, undermining his power network through the removal of identifiable supporters in the hierarchy⁴², and manipulating any organizational structures and technical facilities under their control.⁴³ The desired end-state is discontent among the organization's members, which eventually will force the successor to either step down or conform to the policies of the opposing factions.

The new leader will strive to consolidate his position by mobilizing his own constituents within his power base, by mobilizing neutral constituents (possibly persons previously outside of the political process, such as ethnic or religious minorities), and by attempting to co-opt the

opposition (specifically "disarming competitive elements by appointing them to offices within the political structure and so harnessing their talents to the maintenance of the [new regime]" ⁴⁴).

Regardless of the tactics used, before the successor can begin to operate at full efficiency he will have to ensure that his position as the legitimate leader is secure. The greater the number of factions opposed to his choice as successor, the longer this fight for legitimacy will last. In the interim the organization is forced to operate at a reduced capacity, either by design of the opposing factions, or simply because the leader cannot yet dedicate his efforts to the organization per se. Depending on the hostility of the factions involved, this condition could last for the duration of the leader's rule. For instance, any elected president of the United States will continually fight opposing factions, if for no other reason than he belongs to a separate party. Since the hostility is very low and does not lead to a crisis of the regime, the organization simply operates at a reduced capacity. At the other end of the spectrum, in an extreme case of virulent hostility, the organization could split into multiple factions and operate in conflict against itself, creating a condition of less efficiency than it would have had

operating without a strategic apex. If the factions cannot resolve their differences this case could ultimately lead to civil war in a state system or a "splinter group" in a sub-state system.

One aspect that works to the successor's advantage, regardless of the number of opposing factions, is the fact that the organization is in direct conflict with another organization. As stated previously, organizations tend to centralize when faced with extreme hostility. The hostility from an outside agency tends to dampen internal conflict, allowing the successor the time needed to consolidate his position. Much like the Arab adage "I and my brother against my cousin, I and my cousin against the world", the organization tends to set aside internal differences until the outside threat is eliminated.

b) *The Degree of Horizontal Decentralization*

Horizontal decentralization is the degree of control that subordinate elements hold over each other. Unlike vertical decentralization, with control being released directly from the strategic apex, horizontal decentralization involves control from elements to the left and right.⁴⁵ For instance, the strategic apex of a military organization may allow a logistics unit to decide who gets

specific amounts of ammunition. This creates a condition of horizontal decentralization because a maneuver unit's battle plan is based on ammunition allocated. Thus, even when the strategic apex issues orders, the final plan is based somewhat on the decisions of the logistics unit. The more the organization's subordinate elements rely on parallel elements to affect their operations, the longer it will take the leader to make his presence felt. While mitigating vertical decentralization simply involves pulling more power back to the strategic apex, altering horizontal decentralization requires the organization to restructure its coordinating and operating mechanisms. This type of decentralization usually involves giving power to experts or to analysts.⁴⁶

Power is given to experts when the organization is dependent on some form of specialized knowledge.⁴⁷ The bomb-maker of a terrorist organization is a good example. A successor to the strategic apex of a terrorist organization may wish to alter the method used for coercion from car bombs to letter bombs, but he will be restricted by the expertise of the bomb-maker. Since only the bomb-maker holds the expertise necessary to manufacture the bombs, the successor has lost some control over the method of coercion. If the bomb-makers don't have the expertise for letter

bombs, the successor cannot alter the direction of the organization. He will have to increase the level of expertise in order to alter the direction, and this will take time.

Power to the analysts occurs when an organization relies on systems of standardization for coordination. Power passes from the strategic apex to the analysts who design those systems.⁴⁸ This type of horizontal decentralization is seen in totalitarian states to ensure the continuation of the regime. By design, each agency is forced to rely on another agency in an intricate web, with suspicion fostered between the agencies. In this type of regime the army may depend on the air force, which depends on an intelligence agency, which works for the strategic apex. This prevents any one agency from plotting a coup without bringing on board other agencies that may be hostile to the plotters.⁴⁹ While this type of decentralization helps to ensure the survival of the strategic apex, it also increases the time needed by the successor to gain full control of the organization.

c) *The Frequency of Communication*

A final element affecting the time necessary for the new leader to achieve control is the frequency of

communication. Simply put, the less the strategic apex routinely communicates with its subordinate elements, the longer it will be before the new leader assumes full control of the organization. While this element enhances the ability of the organization to delay the effects of CLT, it also delays the time necessary for the new leader to achieve maximum efficiency because the successor must communicate in order to impose his will. If, for security reasons, the organization is constrained in its communications then there is little the successor can do to speed up the frequency. If he attempts this he may risk increasing the vulnerability of the entire organization, and perhaps himself specifically. This creates a delay in the ability of the leader to inculcate his vision, direction and motivation within the organization.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

The impact of CLT is not only decided by the structural variables of the organization. All organizations discussed, whether state or sub-state, are made up of human beings, not machines, and will exhibit psychological effects from CLT. A structural analysis focuses more on the rational aspects of the organization, but non-rational actions can occur because of the psychological dimension. Rationally, when a

light fails to turn on in the bedroom, one should begin to operate at reduced efficiency when maneuvering through the room in the dark. Non-rationally, one might instead fear what could be hiding in the dark, and leave the room altogether. An isolated structural analysis would not be able to explain such actions. The psychological dimension may cause non-rational effects during CLT, and although they are much harder to quantify or predict, they may be potent and also should be analyzed.

The degree of psychological effect is directly tied to the leadership characteristics within the strategic apex. James M. Burns has proposed a typology of leadership whereby a leader falls along a scale, with "transformational" leadership at one end and "transactional" leadership at the other.⁵⁰

A transformational leader is revered by his constituents, and the power he holds is freely given by members of the organization. He attends to the constituent's higher needs, beyond the day-to-day operation of the organization, and his loyalty is earned because of the persona of the leader himself. Max Weber referred to this as "charismatic leadership", where the leader is "treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least...exceptional powers and qualities...not accessible to the

ordinary person, but of divine origin...".⁵¹ The followers of such a leader believe him infallible, and voluntarily surrender all decisions to him. A prime example of a transformational leader was Jesus Christ. People chose to follow him not based on any legitimate or traditional authority, but simply because of the man himself.

At the other end of the spectrum is the transactional leader. He satisfies the needs of his organization through transactions involving rewards and punishment. He motivates constituents by appealing to their self-interest through the exchange of valued things. "The exchange could be economic or political or psychological in nature; a swap of goods or of one good for money; a trading of votes between candidate and citizen; hospitality to another person in exchange for willingness to listen to one's troubles."⁵² This can be both positive and negative reinforcement. For instance, a corporate leader could offer a promotion to enhance work productivity, or simply threaten to fire the worker to achieve the same results. Either way, the leader is motivating the followers not by attending to the followers higher needs, but through a cost-benefit transaction. Examples of this leadership type abound, most notably when politicians make campaign promises to various constituents in exchange for votes.

In *Rebel Leadership*, James Downton proposes a mid-stage of leadership called the inspirational leader.⁵³ In this case the leader possesses qualities of charisma, but does not instill blind obedience in the follower. "The leader is not perceived as a demigod and the follower consequently maintains his capacity to criticize the leader's behavior."⁵⁴ In this case the leader is still felt to attend to the higher needs of the followers, but not in a manner that is beyond reproach. The leader is not seen as infallible, but is still seen as worthy of following for more than transactional reasons. President John F. Kennedy is an example of this type.

The inspirational type can be confused with transformational leadership. Crises, such as armed conflict, tend to create inspirational leaders simply because "otherwise mature and psychologically healthy individuals may temporarily come to feel overwhelmed, and in need of a strong and self assured leader."⁵⁵ After the crisis is over, the inspirational leader can be cast aside, as was Winston Churchill after World War II. Crisis driven leaders are not necessarily transformational and thus will not have the same psychological impact upon their removal. The difference is leader-pull vs. follower-push. In the transformational case the leader develops a following based

solely on his charismatic presence. In the inspirational case the leader could exist in the strategic apex as a transactional type during periods of calm, but "become" charismatic due to the needs of the followers during a crisis.

1. Effects On The Loss Of Efficiency Within The Organization

For CLT, the more transformational the target, the greater effect his removal is hypothesized to have on an organization. Because a transformational leader's power is centered on the reverence for the leader, and not on rewards or punishment derived from assets within the organization, his removal will impact the organization more than the removal of a transactional leader. Since the leader is seen as the guiding light of the organization, or as the organization's salvation, his removal can deal an enormous psychic blow. An early example of this was the battle between David and Goliath. Goliath was seen as the pillar of strength for the entire Philistine army. His death at the hands of David caused a psychic blow from which the army could not recover. "When the Philistines saw their champion was dead, they fled."⁵⁶ They were conquered, although their army had lost but a single man.

A more modern example occurred during the recent Bosnian conflict. The Muslim town of Srebrenica mentioned earlier was led by a charismatic soldier named Naser Oric. In 1992 he led Muslim forces from Srebrenica to a series of stunning victories, handing the Serbs one of their first major defeats. In 1995 the Serbs surrounded Srebrenica in Oric's absence. The interim leadership of the town, as well as the town population itself, fractured in his absence, as he was seen as the only person capable of succeeding against the Serbs. No credible defense materialized, "chaos reigned...Naser Oric's absence was glaring",⁵⁷ and the population of Srebrenica was systematically slaughtered.⁵⁸

Organizations that are led by a charismatic or transformational leader are necessarily more vulnerable to the loss of the leader precisely because the leader defines the organization. "Such popular charisma with the masses may have afforded the beneficiary-practitioner much of the means for securing power in the first instance, but this dependence renders the system of the charismatic leader all the more vulnerable to political homicide [CLT]."⁵⁹ The organization itself feeds off of the existence of the leader, and although the position will survive, the leader is seen as irreplaceable. In extreme cases the organization

and leader are indistinguishable, such as the Abu Nidal terrorist organization or Adolf Hitler's Germany.

In contrast, a purely transactional leader provides rewards via the assets derived from the organization. Thus, the members of the organization have much less of a psychological attachment to him. Instead the leader is followed primarily on a cost-benefit relationship. Theoretically, in an ideal situation, anyone could provide the same rewards or punishments given the same assets, thus the removal of the current strategic apex will have little psychological effect.

When determining the transformational-transactional characteristics of the strategic apex, it is important to remember that charisma is defined by the culture in question. "Each society has a model of the hero or leader, but the model differs substantially from country to country. The separate personality cults and styles of...leadership are in keeping with specific hero traditions and the national psyches."⁶⁰ Thus, the Iranian population can react in a frenzy of grief, ripping open the casket of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, while the American public watches the spectacle on CNN in puzzled bewilderment.

2. Length Of Time Before The Effects Are Felt Within The Organization

Unlike structural effects, the psychological effects of CLT are felt immediately upon the loss of the leader and extend throughout the recovery cycle. While it may take time for CLT to have a structural effect based on vertical differentiation and frequency of communication, the operating core will experience the psychological effects of CLT as soon as they believe the leader is gone. There is no delay.

3. Length Of Time Before The Organization Provides A Successor

The implications for succession are two fold. First, the charismatic leader tends to feed off of the followers as much as the followers feed off of him. "The charismatic relationship can be a two-way exchange in which the leader comes to see himself as charismatic and lives from day-to-day on the deferential treatment he sees as rightfully his."⁶¹ This leads to the condition of no institutionalized policy for succession because the leader begins to see himself as irreplaceable. Second, subordinates tend live in the shadow of the charismatic leader and thus tend not to develop the institutional characteristics necessary to lead the organization. "The charismatic leader is simply too fond of the limelight to share it. When ultimately the

charismatic departs, a leadership vacuum is created".⁶² Thus, not only do transformational or charismatic organizations tend not to have an institutionalized succession process, but the successor pool is usually ill equipped to assume the mantel of leadership.

4. Length Of Time Before The Successor Reaches Maximum Efficiency

The psychological effects also impact the time necessary for the new leader to achieve legitimacy. Since a transformational leader achieves his following primarily through his perceived charismatic presence rather than through the cost-benefit transactions that he can provide, his successor is automatically behind the power curve. The constituents were following the specific leader, not the position, and thus will not feel any replacement is legitimate. To compound the problem, the successor will have to begin as a transactional leader even if he has charismatic potential. Initially, he will have to achieve control by providing rewards and/or administering punishments. Thus, all things being equal, the greater the degree of transformational characteristics the old leader portrayed, the longer it will take the new leader to achieve that same level of legitimacy.

C. CONCLUSION

CLT is a strategy that should not be taken without specific analysis of the organization targeted. All organizations have differing degrees of vulnerability to CLT. Some organizational characteristics will prevent the strategy from succeeding regardless of the leader targeted.

For instance, CLT may potentially cause an enormous effect on the ability of the organization, but the time it takes the effects to be felt is long and the time for succession is short. The net effect is a very short duration in loss of ability. If the intent were dislocation, CLT would provide little benefit.

Thus, the wide variance in organizational structures plays as great a role in determining success or failure of the strategy as the leader himself. Without systematic analysis of the targeted organization's characteristics it is impossible to determine if the CLT will provide useful leverage.

¹ Jean Blondel, *World Leaders*, p 46

² Ibid, p 56

³ Ibid, p 42

⁴ Ibid, p 40

⁵ Mintzberg, p 110

⁶ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar* (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1996), p 9

⁷ Ibid, p 59

⁸ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), p 118

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Mintzberg, p 161

¹¹ Ibid, p 141

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- ¹² Blondel, p 47
- ¹³ Mintzberg, p 147
- ¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p 100-112
- ¹⁵ Burke Davis, *Get Yamamoto*, (New York: Random House, 1969), p 8
- ¹⁶ Lord and Maher, p 191
- ¹⁷ Mintzberg, p 95
- ¹⁸ Ibid, p 99
- ¹⁹ Ibid, p 101
- ²⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), p 218-219
- ²¹ Mintzberg, p 102
- ²² Clark C. Abt, *A Strategy for Terminating a Nuclear War*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p 39-41
- ²³ Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism" in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996, Volume 75, number 5, p 25
- ²⁴ Ibid
- ²⁵ Bolman and Deal, p 57
- ²⁶ Bolman and Deal, p 58
- ²⁷ Steven Kerr and John W. Slocum, Jr., "Controlling the Performances of People in Organizations" in Paul Nystrom and William H. Starbuck (eds), *The Handbook of Organizational Design, Vol 2*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981) p 125
- ²⁸ Ibid
- ²⁹ U.S. Marine Corps, C4I Division, *Command and Control* (U.S. Marine Corps concept paper, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps), p 61
- ³⁰ Mintzberg, p 137
- ³¹ Thomas Gilmore, *Making a Leadership Change*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), p 92
- ³² Calvert, p 19
- ³³ Jay Taylor, *The Rise and Fall of Totalitarianism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p 90
- ³⁴ Richard Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), p 70
- ³⁵ Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p 145
- ³⁶ Eberhard Sandschneider, "Political Succession in the People's Republic of China: Rule by Purge" in Peter Calvert (ed), *The Process of Political Succession*, (New York: St Martins Press, 1987), p 113
- ³⁷ Ibid
- ³⁸ Calvert, p 7
- ³⁹ Calvert, p 12
- ⁴⁰ Blondell, p 99
- ⁴¹ Sandschneider, p 117
- ⁴² Sandschneider, p 123-124
- ⁴³ Luttwak, p 109
- ⁴⁴ Calvert, p 7
- ⁴⁵ Mintzberg, p 105-106
- ⁴⁶ Ibid
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, p 108-110
- ⁴⁸ Ibid, p 106-108
- ⁴⁹ Isam al-Khafaji, "State Terror and the Degradation of Politics in Iraq", *Middle East Report*, (May-June 1992), p 16
- ⁵⁰ Burns, p 19-20
- ⁵¹ Jay A. Conger, *The Charismatic Leader*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989), p 22-23
- ⁵² Burns, p 19

⁵³ James Downton, *Rebel Leadership*, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p 236

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Jerrold M. Post, "Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship", in *Political Psychology*, vol. 7, no. 4, 1986, p 683.

⁵⁶ Herbert G. May, *The Oxford Annotated Bible*, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), p 355

⁵⁷ David Rohde, *Endgame*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), p 114

⁵⁸ For additional references to Oric and Srebrenica, see *ibid*, p xv, 89, 90

⁵⁹ Walter H. Slack, *The Grim Science: The Struggle for Power*, (Port Washington, NY: National University Publications, 1981), p 111

⁶⁰ Taylor, p 75

⁶¹ Downton, p 230

⁶² Conger, p 158

IV. COMPARISON OF STATE AND SUB-STATE VULNERABILITIES

While each individual organization has a distinctly different degree of vulnerability to CLT, different organizations within the same system, state or sub-state, tend to have the same general characteristics. These characteristics can be used to typify the effect a CLT will have on an organization in that system. Using the model previously developed, this chapter attempts to distinguish the different vulnerabilities to CLT for the state and sub-state organization.

A. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS: STATE AND SUB-STATE

Before analyzing the differences between state and sub-state organizations, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the two terms. As very few persons have the same definition for either organization, this paper will develop its own, drawing from the most commonly held definitions.

1. The State

The easier of the two to define is the state. Simply put, an organization will be classified as a state system if it has a recognized territorial boundary, a formal, recognized government, and a population that considers itself as belonging to it. While arguments abound about the definitional differences between "nation" and "state"¹, the

dynamics of CLT analysis are solely concerned with the recognized, legitimate use of power in a formal organizational structure within a definable territory. Put succinctly, as Max Weber defines it, a state is "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."²

While external recognition is important in determining the legitimacy of the organization, it is not necessarily required for this definition. What is key is internal recognition by the constituents of the organization. If the organization in question maintains a territorial integrity, and openly governs the constituents within it in a single, unified structure, the organization will be considered a state for CLT purposes. For instance, if the Kurds in Northern Iraq declared themselves a state, developed a central governmental structure, and maintained a territorial boundary (assuming they had the ability), they would be considered a state, regardless of the external recognition received. Note that this definition leaves out some modern day organizations that are recognized as "states", such as Somalia. Since no unifying central structure exists, and the constituents hold tribal affiliations much more sacrosanct than state affiliations, Somalia does not meet the definitional requirements. No one organization

maintains the "legitimate use of force within the territory".

2. The Sub-state

While state organizations are fairly straightforward, sub-state organizations are much harder to specifically define. On the surface, anything that is not a state could be considered a sub-state organization. For analysis of CLT the sub-state organization is refined to include only those organizations that exist specifically to counter state organizations, such as insurgencies, "freedom fighter" or "terrorist" groups. If an organization does not meet the definition of state (it exists within a legitimate state's territory, for instance) and it exists to coerce or destroy a state organization, either the one it is co-located with or another one altogether, then it will be considered a sub-state organization.

All sub-state organizations, much more so than state organizations, go through a definite life cycle, and thus a further refinement is necessary. "Indeed, the distinction between tactical nuclear war and conventional war is hardly greater than the distinction between an embryonic and a matured insurgency."³ Sub-state organizations are seeking to expand and grow until they have consumed the state organization. They start from nothing and hope to gain

everything. The structure of the organization will change to reflect the stage of development, becoming more and more state-like as it comes closer to achieving its ultimate goal. Generally, the organization initially relies on "charismatic rule", with the founder of the organization directly controlling all aspects of the organization. As the organization grows, the leader begins to transfer responsibilities to subordinates in a period of "transitional rule". If the leader refuses to do this, the organization stagnates once it reaches the finite span of control of the single leader. If the organization is successful, it eventually becomes a complex system with "institutionalized rule", much like the state system it seeks to replace.⁴

Different sub-state organizations pass through the stages at different times. Some remain transitional up to and including their assumption of control of the state; others institutionalize early on.

The dynamics of CLT vary greatly depending on the stage of development. This analysis focuses on the period of transitional rule, where the sub-state organization has left the simple structure of the single leader, but has not reached the level of success of a mirror-state organization. This is generally the stage at which a sub-state

organization is seen as being a threat. An analysis prior to this stage is not warranted because the organization has not registered as a threat (and quite probably isn't). An analysis too far after is useless because the organization resembles a state to such a degree that a separate analysis is not necessary.

3. Differences Between State and Sub-state conflict

While both state and sub-state organizations share similar traits, such as the need to recruit, train and promote personnel or to locate, produce and distribute goods and services⁵, there are distinct differences between state and sub-state conflict:

a. The sub-state conflict is one of total victory. In a state conflict one side can sue for peace leaving its organization intact, as Iraq did at the end of the Gulf War. In a sub-state conflict, since by definition the sub-state organization's only purpose is the fall of the state, the contest is a zero-sum game. A terrorist or guerilla group cannot surrender and become merchants. In so doing, they cease to exist. The same is true for the state. By surrendering they must hand over control of the state to the insurgents. This is not to say that all sub-state groups must be physically destroyed. State organizations that institute reforms and thereby erode support for the sub-

state group have effectively destroyed the organization while maintaining control.

b. State organizations start conflicts with a force in being. They have their assets and support intact at the initiation of hostilities. Sub-state organizations, as shown above, are a force in development. They are attempting to expand their organization at the same time they are fighting the state. Concurrently, the state is seeking to prevent this expansion. The population is caught in the middle. In a state conflict the population generally sides with the state in which they reside; in a sub-state conflict the population must make a choice between the state and sub-state organization. In order to succeed, the sub-state organization must not only defeat the state infrastructure, but must continually expand to facilitate that destruction.

c. Due to the inherent difference in firepower, sub-state organizations must operate with total secrecy. Their one advantage against the state is their anonymity. If the sub-state organization loses its anonymity, it becomes a target for the state to destroy relatively easily. Thus, everything the sub-state does, to the detriment of other operational considerations, revolves around secrecy and security. By contrast, the state organization can operate

relatively freely within its territorial boundary, regardless of the opponent. The only necessity for secrecy is the standard operational security measures employed during conflict.

4. Hybrid Organizations

The two organizations defined above represent ideal types. Realizing that the real world is fraught with examples that supersede or combine them, it is still useful to create a paradigm for comparison. One hybrid that does deserve mention is the so-called "state sponsored" terrorist group, a sub-state organization that enjoys sanctuary and support from a state, such as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). Initially, the ANO was a revolutionary organization seeking the return of Palestinian land, much like any other sub-state group. Over time it evolved into a mercenary "hired gun", variously employed by Syria, Iraq, and Libya for specific terrorist acts having nothing to do with its original revolutionary goals. "As it has profited from its mercenary role, so the group has progressively relinquished its original revolutionary/political motivations in favour of activities devoted almost entirely to making money."⁶

On the one hand, state sponsored terrorists can operate openly within the supporting state, without the need for total security. On the other hand they must maintain

secrecy within the states they target for action. Where do they fall in the analysis?

In general, terrorist groups fall along a spectrum of violence with "political terrorists" at one end (where the act is purely symbolic and is used as a coercive bargaining tool, with the intended audience psychologically affected), and "redemptive terrorists" at the other end (where the act is directed specifically at the target, for the simple purpose of destroying it, be it for financial, military or even religious reasons).⁷ At the political end of the spectrum a car bomb can be employed to show the sub-state organization's strength and thus engender support for the organization from the population,⁸ at the redemptive end, the car bomb could be used for no other reason than the organization wanted to demolish a building next to it.

The further the state sponsored group moves toward redemptive terrorism, the further they move away from the sub-state paradigm. At the extreme they become nothing more than a commando operation of the supporting state, much like the ANO. A prime example of redemptive terrorism was the Cult of the Assassins during the middle ages. The founder of the Assassins seized several impregnable mountain fortresses and had his organization set about killing all "infidels". The group did not care about achieving or

coercing a state power, only about purifying the countryside of non-believers. The population was either with them or against them - there was no in-between. They killed solely because they viewed their targets as unworthy of living, and in so doing operated much like a state organization from within their mountain stronghold.⁹ Some modern day transnational criminal organizations resemble this structure.

On the other hand, the more the sub-state organization is concerned with the actual battle for control of the constituents of the targeted state, the more it resembles the sub-state paradigm presented. In order to control the population, the sub-state organization must reside within the population. It cannot exist solely within the supporting state and hope to achieve its aims. In addition, unlike a mercenary organization, a sub-state group vying for control of a population depends on the population for support, and thus cannot risk alienating the public or provoking a public backlash with indiscriminate acts of violence.¹⁰ Thus, even with the state sponsorship, sub-state organizations with political aims will fall prey to many of the same constraints of the sub-state paradigm presented.

B. STRUCTURAL EFFECTS

As before, the structural analysis is concerned primarily with the rational operating mechanisms of the targeted organization, rather than such issues as emotional attachments to the targeted leader. State and sub-state organizations have distinctly different degrees of structural vulnerability.

1. Level of Effect on the Efficiency of the Organization

Due to the security requirements placed on the sub-state organization for survival, the level of structural effects are generally less than the effects against the state organization. J. Bowyer Bell states, "As a general rule, the greater the secrecy [required by the organization], the greater the inefficiency of the organization or operation; absolute secrecy assures absolute chaos."¹¹ The sub-state organization must maintain a level of secrecy in order to survive, and this causes inefficiency. In a sense, since sub-state groups must value security above efficiency, they have already conducted limited CLT on their own organization. Control from the top necessarily limits the speed and flexibility of the organization due to the inherent lag time imposed by security considerations, thus the organization is forced to

decentralize to a degree that allows too much flexibility, or remain centralized and risk losing all flexibility.¹² Either way, the sub-state organization is inherently inefficient. Since all sub-state groups must maintain secrecy, "every rebel must maintain cover 24 hours: sleeping, walking, talking, eating, and driving are risks",¹³ the sub-state group begins the conflict inefficient. "All revolutionary organizations that go underground will be inefficient, even if each is so in its own special way."¹⁴ Thus, all things being equal, the structural effects on the loss of efficiency will not have as great an impact on the sub-state organization. This is not to say that CLT does not have an effect on the efficiency of the sub-state group. Usually, finding the sub-state leadership is predicated on a breach of security somewhere within the organization, and this in turn causes greater security measures to prevent future losses of leadership, and a subsequently greater loss in efficiency.¹⁵

For the most part the state organization is under no such security constraints. It can use any communication means within the limits of operational security (security for the specific operation as opposed to the organization as a whole) to achieve its goals. Since each segment of the organization is used to the leader making decisions in real

time, a greater vacuum is created with the removal of a state leader.

While not nearly as problematic as the sub-state organization, state organizations can create inefficiencies as well. Unlike sub-state organizations, usually these inefficiencies enhance the effects of CLT, instead of mitigating them. As shown in the model, lateral communication enhances the efficiency of an organization operating in an uncertain environment. Yet totalitarian states, such as Iraq, prevent lateral communication by inculcating a feeling of animosity between its various armed services and special intelligence units; this prevents collusion against the leadership.¹⁶ While this tends to prevent coups, as everyone is operating against everyone else, it creates inefficiencies that can be exploited by CLT during conflict. Since the units do not communicate laterally with each other due to fear of each other's machinations, they place a greater reliance on the leadership.¹⁷ This might enhance the security of the totalitarian leader's position during peace, but is not conducive to operating as a cohesive whole during conflict. The removal of a leader who has created such inefficiencies leaves a greater vacuum than one who has not.

Like the sub-state organization, the threat of CLT can create additional inefficiencies with the state organization. During WWII both Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler spent the majority of the war in underground bunkers, and during the Battle of the Bulge a rumor of the German Commando Otto Skorzeny attempting to kill the "top Allied commanders led to major security measures that paralyzed the high command for several days."¹⁸

When generally speaking of each system, two of the variables presented by the model favor the state over the sub-state system: (a) the ability of the leader, and (b) the professionalism of the organization.

While not an absolute, on average the sub-state leadership has a greater ability at prosecuting conflict than the state leadership. This is because the sub-state must have some level of ability to reach the transitional stage. The leadership must have a certain level of competency in attacking the state apparatus in order to be viewed as a threat. If the leadership was incompetent at conflict with the state, the sub-state group never would rise above the myriad of other organizations competing for the state's interest. The very fact that the organization is being analyzed as a threat lends credence to the ability of the leadership.

The state leadership, in contrast, may or may not have any level of competence in prosecuting conflict. Unlike the sub-state organization, which exists to counter the state, the state organization performs a multitude of missions besides conflict. Thus, the state leadership may have risen to power for its economic policies or religious affiliations, and may have little competence in warfare.

The sub-state, on average, also has a less professional organization than the state. A professional revolutionary group is an oxymoron. The group does not identify with its revolutionary profession, but with the specific idea that formed the organization. "The armed struggle is no more than an unpleasant and transitory means to the end when the leadership will at last be able to transform the dream into institutions of society and govern."¹⁹ The organization has chosen to confront the state because it sees no other way of attaining its goals. While it is true that some "professional" sub-state organizations, such as perhaps the Abu Nidal organization, are available to the highest bidder, for the most part members of a sub-state group keep fighting because of the allure of an idea.²⁰ If the idea did not exist, they would not belong to the organization. Since, on average, the sub-state is not "more strongly committed to their professional subcultures than to their employing

organization",²¹ they are less professional than the state organization. While a specific state organization is not necessarily more professional, on average state systems are typically more institutionalized and formalized; this in turn tends to lead to greater professionalism.

2. Time Before The Effects Are Felt By The Organization

When comparing state and sub-state organizations, the frequency of communication is the primary structural variable that discriminates the length of time before the effects are felt by the organization. Once again, due to the sub-state organization's need for secrecy, the effects of CLT are felt sooner in the state organization.

For the sub-state organization, "the ideal communication is no communication... Revolutionary messages are difficult to send, rare, short, and seldom require a response."²² Communications within the sub-state organization are inherently dangerous to the survival of the organization. The less communication, the less chance that the enemy will compromise the organization. This drives the sub-state organization to place as much instruction in as little communication as possible.²³ Thus, the operating core of the organization receives orders few and far between. While definitely inefficient, this creates a

structure that can function for a greater length of time without the leader than an organization that is used to frequent communication. For instance, in the Malaya insurgency, due to security needs "the Communist high command convened only about twice a year to map out policy for the entire six month period to come..."²⁴ Structurally, the removal of the communist leadership in Malaya would not have been felt until the next meeting, conceivably up to six months later.

3. Time Before The Organization Provides A Successor

The variable that discriminates between the state and sub-state organization's ability to provide a replacement is the degree that the organization has institutionalized the policy of succession prior to targeting. In general, the older and larger an organization is, the more formalized its behavior.²⁵ Since the state is necessarily larger and older than the sub-state organization, its behavior will be more institutionalized and formalized. All things being equal, a state organization will have a more institutionalized policy of succession than a sub-state organization; it thus will be able to more rapidly provide a successor. This is not to say that sub-state organizations cannot institutionalize a succession policy, but simply that the sub-state organization in the transitional-rule stage of development

generally has not done so. Even if they do, state systems still have an edge. Most state systems have experienced multiple successions and are thus better prepared to execute replacement. Sub-state organizations generally have not had to execute a regular succession policy, and they face greater turmoil when forced to provide a replacement.

Another aspect in the state's favor is the pool of available candidates from which to choose a successor. Generally, the sub-state organization has a limited number of persons qualified to lead the organization and has a larger gap in capability between the higher levels of leadership and the next level below.²⁶ This makes it harder for the sub-state to choose a candidate, increasing the length of time before succession is accomplished. By contrast, the state has a large pool of professional politicians from which to choose, most of whom have already demonstrated their capability, or the lack thereof.

4. Time Before The Successor Reaches Maximum Efficiency

When comparing the state and sub-state organization, the two variables contributing to the time necessary for the successor to achieve maximum efficiency are the frequency of communication and the level of unity within the organization's power base.

While the slow frequency of communication of the sub-state organization delays the time before the effects of CLT are felt, this same attribute adds to the time before the new leadership can achieve control. As shown earlier, the state's ability to rapidly communicate relative to the sub-state will allow the state successor to achieve control faster than the sub-state.

In addition, the lack of communication within the sub-state group impacts on the variable of organizational unity. While neither state nor sub-state organizations display any specific trends towards unity or disunity, the sub-state leadership has a more difficult time achieving control over any opposing faction due, once again, to inherent security considerations. Unlike the state, the new leadership of the sub-state organization cannot call a round-table discussion to convey his vision for the organization. Due to the need for secrecy the successor must rely on inefficient communications. This leads to schisms within the organization, as "disputes easily solved in conventional day-to-day contact or through institutions of conciliation tend to grow and fester in an atmosphere where communication is difficult and one-way."²⁷ This tendency to schism is exacerbated by the ability of persons to leave the organization. Persons not chosen for succession may feel

slighted, and may take their expertise and powerbase away from the current organization by starting a new "splintergroup". This tendency to schism is greatly reduced in the state organization. The loser of the state succession battle can remain inside the state apparatus, or leave the government, but is unlikely to move to a new state. The only schism available is actual civil war, and the driving force required for that to occur is greater than what is required for the sub-state organization to split. Because of this, the sub-state successor is at a disadvantage when compared to the state successor.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

The hypothesis remains that the greater the organizational leadership is transformational, the larger the psychological impact on the organization because of CLT. In general, the sub-state organization will tend to have leadership that is much more transformational than the state organization. The state leader has numerous assets within the organization, both positive and negative, which he can use for transactions with his constituents. Initially, the sub-state organization has nothing but the ability of the leader. The organization can provide its members with few benefits on a transactional basis, as there are few assets

with which to transact. The leader rarely has assets to offer other than himself. If the organization is to expand, it must do so based on the transformational effects of the leadership. If the organization has reached the transitional stage - that is, it has expanded to a level where assets have started to become available for transactional approaches - it is usually because the leadership has created a great enough following based on charisma.

Once in the transitional stage the organization can begin to expand with transactional leadership by providing benefits to would-be constituents, both positive and negative.²⁸ The organization's growth becomes based more and more on transactional approaches, but the charismatic effects of the leadership remain. Thus, even after the organization has reached the institutionalized rule stage, the leadership is still seen with "God-given" gifts. For instance, in a survey of 1000 Cuban respondents, 43 percent viewed Fidel Castro as a man like Jesus Christ, "and in many Cuban homes the resemblance of Castro's portraits with those of Christ were striking."²⁹

The effect of transformational leadership poses a paradox for the sub-state group. While the organization usually does not begin to grow without it, it creates a

condition of debilitating psychological impact should the leader be removed. In addition, due to the peculiarities of sub-state conflict, this impact is felt more by the sub-state organization than the state given two leaders of equal transformational qualities.

First, while the impact felt by both the state and sub-state organization is one of profound loss, the sub-state organization is much more susceptible to disintegration. The members of the state organization remain with the state after the loss of the leader. The constituents who followed the state leader for transformational reasons will not elect to renounce their membership with the state because of his removal, but the members of the sub-state organization might. Much more so than the state organization, the sub-state organization operates on faith. While it may be rationally seen as impossible for the sub-state organization to actually defeat the state, the organization continues thriving on the simple faith that it can be done.³⁰ This faith is bound by the "infallible leader", and with his removal it can be shaken.

The sub-state organization requires a core of fervent supporters who are willing to sacrifice their lives.³¹ Generally, this core is fervent for transformational reasons, that is they are "true believers" of an idea, not

of the benefits they will receive, and are usually the nucleus of the organization. With the loss of the transformational leader the fervent believers may simply opt to leave the organization, thus starting a chain reaction whereby transactional approaches cannot be met, and a possible disintegration of the organization.

Second, unlike the state organization, the psychological impact on the sub-state organization also extends to persons following the leader for transactional reasons. As stated, the state begins the conflict with its organization already in existence. The sub-state starts from nothing and must expand to succeed. Much of the expansion of the sub-state is based on a perception of strength. Support of the group is based on the prospects of success of that group. People join the organization based on the psychological belief that it will win. Thus, members may join simply to avoid being left on the losing side.³² The state's ability to selectively target a leader viewed as "infallible" by some will lead to a perception of weakness for the sub-state organization and a perception of strength for the state,³³ subsequently leading to a loss of support for the sub-state organization. Even people drawn to the organization for transactional reasons greater than simply siding with the winner are more inclined to side with the

state because the immediate benefits the sub-state organization can provide are outweighed by the belief that the state will ultimately win. This, in turn, also leads to a halt in the sub-state organization's growth, if not an actual decline.

This psychological impact is seen most starkly with the Shining Path sub-state organization in Peru. The Shining Path is a Marxist-Maoist sub-state organization that has been trying to destroy the legitimate state apparatus of Peru since the late 1970's.³⁴ It's leader, Abimael Guzman, created a tremendous transformational following, achieving a status "far greater than that of mere guerrilla leader".³⁵ Being called everything from "horseman of the apocalypse" to "philosopher king", Guzman cultivated an image of infallibility. As he could never be caught, people began to give him mythical abilities, saying he escapes by turning into a bird, a snake, or a stone.³⁶ By September of 1992 the Shining Path were on the verge of toppling the Peruvian government. Armed platoons of fifty or more guerrillas bombed downtown Lima with impunity. Businesses prepared to close as people began to leave the country.

If the pressure had been maintained, it would have led to the collapse of banks and government revenue, with no money to pay the army or other state workers, a massive loss of jobs, and a collapse in services as well as law and order.

The state would have been at the mercy of the Shining Path.³⁷

On September 12, 1992, the pressure was relieved when Abimael Guzman was captured through old-fashioned police work. Within twenty-four hours the psychological impact of his capture caused the entire offensive to falter. The organization began to come apart at the seams. Hundreds of Guerrillas surrendered, terrorist incidents nation-wide dropped markedly, and the defeatist mindset of the population of Peru was replaced with one of euphoria.³⁸ While the Shining Path continues to exist in Peru, "Guzman's capture will probably mean that Shining Path will never take power. He has been both the head and body of the revolution and has been given a semi-divine status by many of his followers."³⁹ The psychological impact of CLT on the Shining Path is the primary reason the legitimate Peruvian government remains in power.

D. CONCLUSION

Taken as a whole, Counter-Leadership Targeting impacts sub-state organizations more than state organizations. While the state suffers greater structural effects (mainly because the sub-state organization is inefficient to begin with); it can recover from the effects more quickly than sub-state organizations. The sub-state organization's drive

for security and its limited number of qualified leaders hampers its ability to recover. In addition, the inability of the sub-state successor to quell disagreements within the organization can lead to splits, creating "splinter groups". These groups hinder the ability of any sub-state organization to succeed because it forces all organizations to compete with each other for resources while fighting the state.

The sub-state organization also is more susceptible to psychological effects. It is not only much more likely to have a charismatic leader at the helm, but because it must grow to succeed, the removal of this leader has a greater impact than the removal of a state leader with the same qualities. The psychological impact on the state is the simple loss of the leader. As shown with the Shining Path, the sub-state not only incurs the psychological loss of the leader, but also the loss of the perception of success, and a subsequent decline in support for the organization.

Some have postulated that information technologies will allow the sub-state group to alleviate its inefficiencies and increase its protection from CLT by giving rise to network forms of organizations. John Arquilla writes that,

...[T]errorist organizations are leaving behind the era of the "great man" leader, and moving to use flexible network designs that have multiple

leaders. The PLO of Arafat is less the paradigm than the "governance of many" seen in Hamas. Because of the shift from absolutist hierarchies to hydra-headed networks, none are as easy to "decapitate" as they may once have been.⁴⁰

Whether this prediction comes true remains to be seen.

One area it does highlight is the possible increasing difficulty of identifying the strategic apex of the sub-state group. If more and more groups begin to network to facilitate operations, it will become harder and harder to draw the boundaries between groups, and thus harder to identify the strategic apex in question. This future of networking could lead to a mis-diagnosis of certain sub-state organizations as "hydra-headed networks" when in fact they are separate, distinct organizations simply sharing assets.

¹ For an in depth discussion of the various definitions of "nation", "state" and "nation-state" see Walker Conner, *Ethnonationalism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p 90-100

² Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States and Disputed Lands*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p 3

³ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 1970), p 51

⁴ Eberhard Sandschneider, "Political Succession in the People's Republic of China: Rule By Purge", in Peter Calvert (ed), *The Process of Political Succession*, (New York: St Martins Press, 1987), p 130

⁵ Leites and Wolf, p 48

⁶ Hoffman, p 187

⁷ The Spectrum of Violence was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

⁸ For a discussion on the symbolic use of violence, see Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" in Harry Eckstein, (ed), *Internal War*, (West Port: Greenwood Press, 1964), p 77-91

⁹ David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions", *The American Political Science Review*, 78:3 (September 1984), p 664-668

¹⁰ Hoffman, p 189

¹¹ J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Summer 1990, p 203.

¹² *Ibid*, p 202

¹³ *Ibid*

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- ¹⁴ Ibid, p 209
- ¹⁵ Brian Jenkins, *Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassination?*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1987), p 4
- ¹⁶ Isam al-Khafaji, "State Terror and the Degradation of Politics in Iraq", *Middle East Report*, (May-June 1992), p 16
- ¹⁷ James Adams, *The Next World War*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1998), p 49
- ¹⁸ R. Cargill Hall (ed), *Lightning Over Bougainville*, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), p 39
- ¹⁹ Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics", p 196
- ²⁰ Ibid
- ²¹ Steven Kerr and John W. Slocum, Jr., "Controlling the Performances of People in Organizations" in Paul Nystrom and William H. Starbuck (eds), *The Handbook of Organizational Design, Vol 2*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981) p 125.
- ²² Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics", p 203
- ²³ Ibid
- ²⁴ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1970), p 60
- ²⁵ Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p.123,126
- ²⁶ Leites and Wolf, p 81
- ²⁷ J Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem", *Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 3:1, Spring 1989, p 27-28.
- ²⁸ For a discussion on the transactional approaches during insurgency see Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p 243-267
- ²⁹ James V. Downton, *Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process*, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p 213
- ³⁰ Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld", p 17
- ³¹ Leites and Wolf, p 11
- ³² For an in-depth discussion of perceptions of strength influencing mobilization, see Gordon H. McCormick and Guillermo Owen, "Revolutionary Origins and Conditional Mobilization", *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol 12, 1996.
- ³³ Leites and Wolf, p 137
- ³⁴ Simon Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, (United Kingdom: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), p 2-4
- ³⁵ Simon Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, (New York: Random House, 1992), p 23
- ³⁶ Ibid, p 31
- ³⁷ Ibid, p 266
- ³⁸ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist insurgency since the Vietnam War*, (Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), p 280
- ³⁹ Strong, "Terror and Revolution", p 269
- ⁴⁰ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), p 457

V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

With any action as volatile as CLT the potential for effects outside of the desired results are high. They include the creation of martyrs, the possibility of reciprocal targeting, the effects of failed attempts, and the effects on the targeting organization.

A. THE RISK OF CREATING A MARTYR

An obvious consequence not sought by CLT is the transformation of the target into a martyr revered by the targeted organization. This condition is extremely difficult to predict, as it depends greatly on the successor's ability to use the target's death as propaganda for that aim. Still, the tendency toward martyrdom is hypothesized to be directly related to the target's transformational leadership characteristics. Since a transformational leader's following is derived from his charisma, it is logical to assume that he will be a more likely candidate for martyrdom. A transactional leader is not as susceptible since his constituents are motivated by the resources derived from the leadership position. Thus, the greater the transformational characteristics, the greater the chance of creating a martyr. From the

discussion of state and sub-state organizations it follows that state leadership is less susceptible to martyrdom than sub-state leadership.

While the psychological characteristics dictate the probability of creating a martyr, the structural characteristics determine the extent the martyr syndrome can affect the results of the CLT.

1. The Martyr Syndrome and the Dislocation Strategy

In a dislocation strategy, the greater the structural effects, the less the martyr syndrome, even if it occurs, will impact the intended results. If the target becomes a martyr, the organization will still suffer structural effects, allowing the dislocation strategy to continue. On the other hand, if the target or organization is structurally unsuited for CLT, such as with a figurehead or a networked organization, the martyr syndrome is likely to be extremely dangerous. The organization loses none of its structural ability to operate and gains a significant psychological motivation against the targeting organization.

2. The Martyr Syndrome and the Replacement Strategy

The martyr syndrome is most dangerous with a strategy of replacement. As stated earlier, this strategy is dependent on the vision of the succeeding leader. He, in

turn, is dependent on the powerbase of the organization. The creation of a martyr can alter the views of this powerbase, and thus force the successor to backpedal from a new vision. An organization amenable to change before the martyr syndrome may become psychologically entrenched with the vision of the targeted leader, causing the replacement strategy to fail.

As stated earlier, in order for a replacement strategy to succeed, there must be a discrepancy between the visions/policies of the targeted leader and the visions/policies of the powerbase of the organization. Even if this discrepancy exists before targeting, the martyr syndrome might cause it to disappear. While the organization might grumble about the leadership policies while the leader is alive, the martyr syndrome can cause the organization to coalesce around the leader after his death, ensuring that his once hated policies become fact.

One mitigating factor for the replacement strategy is that the successor should have no desire to use the death of the previous leader as propaganda for creating a martyr. Since his views are presumably contradictory with the targeted leader, he should realize that helping to create a martyr might restrict his ability to instill his vision.

B. THE RISK OF RECIPROCAL TARGETING

One risk often brought up whenever discussing a policy of CLT is that of reciprocal targeting or "blowback". The argument is that by initiating a campaign of CLT the targeting organization invites reprisals in kind, reprisals that it might be less effective at countering. This is the purported reason behind Saddam Hussein's alleged attempted to kill former President Bush while he was visiting Kuwait after the Gulf War.¹

While on the surface such a risk seems worthy of debate before a CLT strategy is implemented, in reality the risks derived from blowback are minimal.

The sub-state organization is less likely to conduct reciprocal targeting because it is forced to operate with minimal resources. It cannot afford to squander resources with reciprocal targeting unless that targeting will accomplish something towards organizational goals.

Engaging in violence for reasons other than its presumable contribution to ultimate victory may then appear, to the perfect rebel, to be a serious matter, conduct to which one would feel tempted only in extreme conditions and which may even - or especially - then be a grave sin.²

Thus, the insurgent group is not likely to engage in reciprocal targeting unless it is helpful to its cause. If it is helpful, the sub-state group will initiate the

targeting. Historically, a primary tactic of the sub-state group is to target the state leadership in an attempt to sever state ties with the population or gather publicity.³ For instance, one of the PLO architects of the 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich stated that he engineered the killings because,

Bombing attacks on El Al [Israeli airline] offices do not serve our cause. We have to kill their most important and most famous people. Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and sportsmen.⁴

This statement also tends to dispel the notion that the state leadership is tactically more vulnerable to CLT than the sub-state leadership. The PLO yearned to attack the state leadership, but didn't have the ability.

During state conflict the leadership of the state organization takes measures to protect itself regardless of previous CLT attempts. As stated earlier, both Churchill and Hitler spent the majority of WW II in underground bunkers. This was not because of reciprocal targeting, but because of fears of initial targeting. Had a campaign of CLT been implemented, a resulting blowback would not have significantly altered the security already in place, or the attendant risks. The state must assume that its leadership is already a target. As with the sub-state organization, if the state's survival is threatened it may not hesitate

to initiate a strategy of CLT if such targeting will prevent its demise.

In conclusion, the threat of blowback is not as great as it may appear. In both state and sub-state conflict a strategy of CLT may be implemented, and thus must be protected against. There is no guarantee that by not engaging in CLT the opponent will follow suit. Holding off from initiating a strategy of CLT because of fear of blowback may deny strategic benefits at the expense of being targeted anyway.

C. THE EFFECTS OF FAILED ATTEMPTS

Failed CLT attempts can have unintended consequences as well, most notably in sub-state conflict. In state conflict the primary effect is increased security around the opposing state leadership, thereby denying or raising the costs of future CLT attempts.

Because of the nature of sub-state conflict, failed attempts could actually help the sub-state group by enhancing its prestige and legitimacy. In Somalia, Task Force Ranger made six separate attempts to capture Aidid prior to the October raid. Each failed attempt lent Aidid greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people, and a subsequent increase in the size of Aidid's SNA militia.

Instead of support for Aidid remaining stable, as the UN assumed, it began to snowball. This would prove disastrous for Task Force Ranger, as the resistance met during the 3-4 October raid was exponentially larger than the resistance experienced on previous raids.⁵

In the end the failed CLT attempts left Aidid with a much larger power base than that with which he began. "Aidid became a genuine folk hero. The prevailing image was of Aidid, a Third World underdog, scrapping gamely with the world's most powerful nation."⁶

As shown with the Shining Path, this effect is a double-edged sword for the sub-state group. While the unsuccessful attempts may lend credence to the "infallible leader" and an increase in the sub-state membership, a subsequent successful CLT can create a greater psychological impact as the constituents realize the leader is human after all.

D. THE EFFECTS ON THE TARGETING ORGANIZATION

Due to the wide array of latitude allowed by various forms of government towards CLT, this section focuses on democratic institutions as the targeting organization. Other forms of government, such as totalitarian dictatorships, have a much greater degree of freedom in

choosing a course of action because the perception of the people they represent means little in the operation of the government, as "popular domestic opposition is not tolerated"⁷. A targeting organization that is a democratic institution, such as the United States, does not have such immunity to the effects of CLT. The operation must be viewed as legitimate within the eyes of the public, or it risks losing whatever leverage was to be gained.

1. Democratic Impediments to a Strategy of CLT

There are two problems that must be overcome within the targeting organization when conducting CLT: (a) Reservations of vital interests, and (b) Reservations of morality.

a) Reservations of Vital National Interest

Before the constituents of a democratic institution lend support for CLT, the operation must be viewed as necessary for the interests of the state. This aspect is nothing more than the weighing of the costs and benefits that generally occur prior to committing personnel from a democratic state to any conflict. For instance, within the United States, the gravity of the stakes influences the willingness of the public to commit forces; the more limited the perceived relationship with US

interests, the more limited the willingness to commit forces.⁸ This is truer with modern conflict than ever before. According to James Adams,

It is no longer the case that public support for national endeavors will be granted automatically. On the contrary, gaining public support for any kind of military action will be very hard.⁹

The impact of a lack of public support can be most noticeably seen in the U.S. public reaction to the failed raid against Aidid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. In May of 1993, following a widely publicized ceremony in which President Clinton welcomed home the troops who had served in UNITAF, the American public perception was that U.S. troops were no longer a large part of the military mission in Somalia, and certainly weren't involved in combat operations.¹⁰

Concerned about perceptions of increasing commitments in Somalia, the Clinton administration chose to send the force targeted against Aidid, Task Force Ranger, quietly. Instead of trying to legitimize the CLT operation, the administration hid the task force's actual mission within the overall security issue of Somalia. Commenting on the task force deployment, pentagon spokesperson Kathleen de Laski stated that there was no change to official U.S. policy in Somalia: "This is not an

effort to go after one man. It's an effort to improve the overall situation in Mogadishu."¹¹ This confusion continued even after the firefight. In hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on 19-20 October 1993, the task force objectives were described as follows:

Although there were no specific orders to arrest General Aidid, there was broader mission guidance that allowed for the detention of Aidid if encountered during security operations. The Ranger force...conducted many of these types of operations...¹²

Contrast these statements with the testimony of the Task Force Ranger Commander, Maj. Gen. William Garrison, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1994:

Very simply, our mission was to deploy to Somalia and to apprehend Aidid and unarm his lieutenants. This mission was stated...clearly on August 22, [1993] when we deployed. We started looking at it on about June 5.¹³

Clearly, Task Force Ranger was pursuing a CLT campaign. Just as clearly, the Clinton administration, far from trying to garner favorable public support for such a strategy, chose to hide the mission, most likely due to a fall in public support for Somalia operations.¹⁴ The end result was an American public shocked about U.S. forces being committed to combat operations, and a total loss of public support for Somalia operations overall. While

public opinion, contrary to popular belief, did not demand immediate withdrawal from Somalia, primarily because one of the U.S. soldiers was a POW, the firefight of 3-4 October hardened the view for an orderly withdrawal.¹⁵ Had the Clinton administration used the deaths of the Pakistani UN contingent and the UN resolutions to galvanize public opinion, much like it galvanized the administration into acting in the first place, the firefight on 3-4 October might have hardened public resolve for U.S. soldiers to stay. If the Clinton administration had legitimized the CLT instead of hiding it, it might have had public support for the operation in addition to public recognition of the risks. Since the public had only given support for limited humanitarian operations, they were not willing to suffer the deaths due to overt hostile actions.

b) Reservations of Morality

In addition to a vital interest, the dynamics of CLT demand that the operation be viewed as morally justifiable before support is given. In general, democratic institutions seek to possess the moral high ground during a conflict; they thus hold a dim view of anything that can be perceived as assassination.¹⁶ To overcome these inhibitions the target must be perceived as

demonstrably evil. The "enemy must be represented as a menacing, murderous aggressor, a satanic violator of the moral and conventional standards, an obstacle to the cherished aims and ideals of the nation as a whole..."¹⁷ The greater the perceived evil of the target, the less the public outcry for restraint of CLT. This problem is more pronounced within sub-state conflict. Because the conflict is asymmetric with respect to the relative strength of each side, the state is expected to adhere to a more stringent standard of conduct. "When the survival of the nation is not directly threatened, and when the obvious asymmetry in conventional military power bestows an underdog status on the [sub-state] side, the morality of the war is more easily questioned"¹⁸, and thus CLT is harder to justify.

2. Democratic Strategies for Overcoming Impediments

Generally, the targeting organization has two choices to help overcome these problems: either generate enough public support to allow an overt attempt or attempt the CLT covertly. Both options are open to unintended consequences.

a) *Unintended Consequences of Overt CLT*

The first option available to the democratic state seeking a strategy of CLT is to generate enough

public support for the operation to allow an overt CLT attempt. Public support for CLT usually entails structuring the perception of the target within the eyes of the targeting organization's population.* As stated above, the target must be perceived as evil, and this generally turns on the democratic state leadership demonizing the target enough to overcome any reservations about specifically targeting him.

While creating hatred of a target can generate public support for CLT, this support can have a backlash effect if the operation is not carried through. Once the public is convinced that the target is worthy of CLT, they will expect the leader to be removed.

On February 4, 1988, the U.S. Justice department indicted Manuel Noriega on thirteen counts of narco-trafficking and racketeering.¹⁹ As a prelude to Operation Just Cause, President Bush rallied public opinion against Noriega by demonizing him, using the drug charges as a weapon. The charges allowed him to quell dissension about targeting a foreign head of state, in effect legitimizing a CLT attempt both in the U.S. and Panama.

* While attempts at managing the perceptions of the public in order to engender support are clearly seen in any democratic public forum from tobacco taxes to a declaration of war, I wish to stress that this section merely seeks to explore the relationship between public opinion and CLT. It makes no value judgements as to the ethical considerations such perception management might engender.

The purpose of the invasion of Panama was to restore democracy by replacing Noriega. By using the drug indictments to sway public perception against the dictator, however, the administration created a condition where success was tied to his capture. Unfortunately, the administration was much more concerned about restoring democracy to Panama than capturing Noriega for trial. In fact, before the invasion, a plan was proposed whereby the indictments would be dropped if Noriega voluntarily stepped down.²⁰

By using the "war on drugs" in the perception battle the administration unknowingly centered all operations on Noriega instead of Panama in the eyes of the American public. By 1989 Americans felt that the drug issue was a greater threat than communism.²¹ While the administration's political goal was to restore democracy, a majority of the American public felt that the operation would be a failure without the capture of Noriega.²² This perception caused some consternation within the Bush administration. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was rebuked at a press conference when he reported the operation successful with the installation of the new president and democratic

government. The reporters wanted to know how the operation was successful without the capture of Noriega.²³

While the overall information strategy against Noriega helped to generate public support for a U.S. intervention into Panama, the use of drug indictments in shaping perceptions caused the capture of Noriega to overshadow all other operations and changed the definition of success for the intervention. The American people no longer cared what form of government was installed in Panama, as long as Noriega was captured.

Desert Storm provides a better example of perception management backfiring. When President Bush drew a "line in the sand" he made it perfectly clear whom that line was drawn against - Saddam Hussein. In building the coalition against Saddam, Bush portrayed him in the worst possible light, and yet Saddam himself was never stated as an overt military goal; he was, however, pursued throughout the actual conflict.

Far from actually being off limits, President Bush felt that a CLT replacement strategy was necessary to achieve his national policy objective of "security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf" and went to great efforts to achieve this goal. To the President, Saddam epitomized the problem. He demonized him at every

opportunity, saying Saddam was "worse than Hitler" and painting the war as a struggle between good and evil.

While addressing a convention of National Religious

Broadcasters President Bush stated:

It has everything to do with what religion embodies - good versus evil, right versus wrong, human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression...It is a just war. And it is a war which good will prevail.²⁴

Bush was caught between his belief that Saddam's removal was necessary for the security of the region and his fear, also held by the military, that his removal might require an occupation of Baghdad.

Other reasons for not making Saddam an overt target were concerns about a fracture in the balance of power in the middle-east after the cessation of hostilities, the sensitivities of the members of the coalition, and the fact that, unlike Panama, no suitable leader existed to replace Saddam.²⁵ Finally, the Bush administration may have feared overtly targeting Saddam for the reservations of morality previously discussed. When the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Dugan, suggested to reporters that the best way to hurt Saddam was to target him and his family, he was relieved, quite possibly because "Dugan's remarks appeared to eliminate any room for

'plausible deniability' were Hussein, or his family, to become casualties of an air raid."²⁶

While the various reasons for not overtly stating Saddam as a target appear sound, surprisingly, he was in fact targeted. General Swarzkopf himself stated:

After the shooting started we repeatedly asserted that the United States was not trying to kill Saddam Hussein - President Bush said so himself - and that was true, to a point. But at the very top of our [air campaign] target list were the bunkers where we knew he and his senior commanders were likely to be working.²⁷

We deliberately tried to kill Saddam from the first sortie of the air campaign to the dropping of two specially made deep-penetrating bunker munitions on the last day of the ground campaign.²⁸

Whether Saddam was overtly stated as a target or not, the administration's rhetoric had the effect of shaping perceptions towards him as someone worthy of targeting. The President's "descriptions of Saddam encouraged the view that this *should* be the objective or that, despite disclaimers, it actually was."²⁹ These descriptions worked.

In Britain a poll on the eve of the land war showed nine out of ten thought that Saddam should be brought to trial, with 70 percent favoring assassination! In the United States it was reported that 71 percent of the American people believed that the toppling of Saddam should be an allied goal, while only 29 percent of respondents

in a Newsweek survey believed that an Iraqi withdrawal with Saddam still in power would constitute a coalition victory.³⁰

Once again, President Bush had created a monster that the American public wanted to see removed. Like Panama, the perception management accomplished more than it intended. Instead of simply creating a situation for support of intervention on behalf of Kuwait, it created an endstate that the public felt should be achieved for success. When the war concluded with Saddam still in power it left a bitter taste. Almost immediately after the ceasefire the public began to question what we had accomplished with Saddam still in power. The one-year anniversary of the war was celebrated by books with titles such as *Triumph Without Victory*. In the end, "by relentlessly demonizing the enemy and defining the struggle in moral terms, Bush had dug himself a trap. He could win the war...and still lose the crusade."³¹ "Perhaps if, in President Bush's rhetoric, [Saddam] had not been built up into such a monster [the war's endstate] would have sufficed, but for a monster it was not good enough."³²

b) Unintended Consequences of Covert CLT

A successful CLT done covertly can overcome both domestic obstacles of morality and national interest, as

well as all of the other unintended consequences listed. For instance, in 1974, during the Rhodesian conflict, the Rhodesian government managed to covertly assassinate the national chairman of ZANU, the political wing of one of the insurgency forces vying for power. This was done inside neighboring Zambia in such a way as to suggest that his "death by car bomb was due to factional fighting within that organization."³³ This led to a fracture within ZANU, as well as the loss of Zambia as a safe haven, which cost the rebels "an estimated two years in its war against Rhodesia."³⁴ Thus, not only did keeping the operation covert alleviate domestic obstacles, it also prevented any martyrdom effects from being directed at the Rhodesian state and had had the added bonus of directing any reciprocal targeting inward against the sub-state organization itself.

Covert CLT also can alleviate the effects of failed attempts. If one does not declare a policy of CLT, then one cannot overtly fail. This is another speculated reason for not overtly targeting Saddam Hussein.

Remembering the hunt for Noriega during Just Cause, then Army chief of staff Carl Vuono stated "Let's not get ourselves in another situation like Panama where the whole goddam operation depends on finding one guy in a bunker."³⁵

While the covert approach appears to be a panacea, there are drawbacks that mitigate against its use. First, covert CLT eliminates any deterrent or coercive effects to be gained. As stated earlier, deterrence and coercion are dependent on the opposition believing that the defending organization has both the will and the means to carry out the CLT. If the strategy is conducted in secret, the credibility of will and the subsequent intended message is lost, and "the real purpose of the strategic operation is frustrated."³⁶

Second, covert operations suffer precisely because they must remain secret. "One of the costs of secrecy is that a vigorous and open examination of reasons for, and likelihood of success of, an operation will not take place."³⁷ This could lead to "group-think",

A process by which "members of any small cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps by unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reality testing."³⁸

Thus, the covert group espousing a strategy of CLT may have deluded itself as to the prospects of success. Since the CLT is to remain secret, no one outside of the select group gets the chance to question the merits of the strategy.

In September of 1997 the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, attempted to target a leader of the terrorist group Hamas within the Jordanian capitol of Amman. The operation was an unmitigated disaster that caused extensive political damage to the new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. It almost wrecked Israel's relationship with King Hussein of Jordan, one of the few Arab leaders committed to the peace process. In the words of an Israeli intelligence expert, group-think had caused

the worst disaster in the history of the Mossad...both the agency's chiefs and Prime Minister Netanyahu will be called upon to explain themselves. This operation showed up astonishing errors, not just in the failure of its execution but in its very conception.³⁹

Due to the covert nature of the operation, many of the heads of Mossad who should have been in the planning were excluded, including the Mossad station chief in Amman. Thus, the "implications of the Amman operation - and the consequences for failure - were not properly considered."⁴⁰

Finally, the greatest danger of covert CLT is with the operation becoming known and the ensuing backlash of public outrage. As seen with the Somalia example, this outrage could extend beyond the operation to affect public opinion and support for the entire conflict, thereby undermining the very objectives sought by the CLT. Some

have even postulated that this type of deception extends beyond the conflict by having a corrosive effect on the public trust of all aspects of the government.⁴¹

A good example of the covert approach gone awry is the Phoenix Project in Vietnam. Mention the Phoenix Project to the average American and images of black clad assassins sneaking through the night usually comes to mind. Whatever the truth, the perception within America will always be one of an agency gone amok. This is a direct result of the targeting organization, the government of the United States, trying to keep the operation covert, coupled with the skillful perception management of those opposed to the conflict in Vietnam. In the end the project was dismantled, not because of a lack of effectiveness, but because of a public backlash in the United States over its morality. Instead of trying to legitimize or generate public support for the operation, the creators chose to simply keep the project secret. As they would ruefully discover, this would prove impossible in a conflict that was extensively covered by the press. Officially falling back on the classification of Phoenix also provided the anti-war contingents the upper hand in the battle of public opinion by giving them the first shot. One of the first people to speak out about Phoenix was a soldier named Ed

Murphy. He was assigned to the intelligence section of the Fourth Infantry Division from May of 1968 to June of 1969. In this capacity he was the liaison to the local Phoenix coordinator. After rotating back to the United States, he began to speak out against the war.⁴² He used Phoenix to do so: "To me, Phoenix was a lever to use to stop the war. You use what you got. I got Phoenix."⁴³ As Douglas Valentine recounts:

Intent on making Phoenix a domestic political issue to be used to stop the war, Murphy joined two other Vietnam veterans...in an effort to inform the public. At news conferences held simultaneously in New York, San Francisco, and Rome on April 14, 1970, the three veterans issued a joint press release...laying out the "facts" about Phoenix. (Quotations added)⁴⁴

This created a snowball effect through which more and more attention began to be drawn to the program. The press began to investigate in earnest. In 1970 Newsweek ran a story called "The Rise of Phoenix" where the CIA was alleged to be countering "VC terror with terror of its own."⁴⁵ Georgie Anne Geyer, one of the few journalists to actually accompany a Phoenix operation, titled her expose "The CIA's Hired Killers."⁴⁶ As the program was classified, most of the journalists had to rely on dubious sources for information. These sources made all types of allegations, which, because of the classification of the operation, were

not countered by anyone within the administration.⁴⁷ The snowball culminated in 1970 and 1971 with senate hearings on the operations of Phoenix. William Colby, then chief of the CIA's far-east division, finally began to counter the allegations laid against Phoenix.⁴⁸ However, his efforts ultimately failed. The perceptions in the minds of the American public were cast, and Phoenix began a downhill slide that ultimately ended with it being dismantled. "By 1972, rather than suffer additional public opinion damage, American officials opted to recommend dissolution of the program."⁴⁹

The effects of the Phoenix Project continued beyond the Vietnam War. It didn't simply cease to exist because of public outrage, but was one of the forces, along with other alleged assassination attempts, used for the evisceration of the CIA during the Church Committee proceedings.⁵⁰

Thus, while a successful covert CLT can alleviate unintended consequences, "the illusion of secrecy can provide a false and treacherous sense of security."⁵¹ Although there could be compelling circumstances for performing covert CLT, it must be remembered that, if not executed carefully, the risks of the covert option may

bring about much greater costs than the predicted benefits to be gained by the targeting.

¹ Kenneth Watman, et al, *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), p 74

² Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 1970), p 94

³ Ibid, p 54-55

⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p 71

⁵ For the a detailed account of the battle, see Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991)

⁶ Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p 86

⁷ Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" in *World Politics*, Jan. 1975, p 189

⁸ Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1996), p xvi-xvii.

⁹ James Adams, *The Next World War*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1998), p 284

¹⁰ Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, "Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations", (Office of the Secretary of Defense White Paper, 1996, <http://sac.saic.com/SOMALIA.HTM>), p 13

¹¹ Patrick J. Sloyan, "Hunting Down Aidid; Why Clinton Changed Mind", *Newsday*, (December 6, 1993)

¹² Clairborne Pell, Chairmen of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, Hearings on 19-20 October 1993*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1993), p 40

¹³ Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, *US Military Operations in Somalia - Hearings on 12, 21 May 1994*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p 2

¹⁴ Larson, p 44

¹⁵ Ibid, p 68-70

¹⁶ Roger G. Herbert, *Bullets with Names: The Deadly Dilemma*, (Monterey: NPS Thesis, 1992), p 89-93.

¹⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "Propaganda" in Robert Jackall (ed.), *Propaganda*, (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p 18.

¹⁸ Mack, p 186

¹⁹ Kevin Buckley, *Panama*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1991), p 117

²⁰ Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995), p 387

²¹ Buckley, p 117

²² Larson, p 41

²³ Powell, p 430

²⁴ Rick Atkinson, *Crusade; The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), p 194

²⁵ Atkinson, p 299-300

²⁶ W. Michael Reisman and Jams E. Baker, *Regulating Covert Action*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), p 127

²⁷ Norman Swazkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, (New York: Bantam Publishing, 1992), p 319

²⁸ Atkinson, p 473

²⁹ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p 219

³⁰ Ibid, p 412

³¹ Atkinson, p 194-195

³² Freedman and Karsh, p 439

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- ³³ Bruce Hoffman, et al, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p 35
- ³⁴ Ibid
- ³⁵ Atkinson, p 273
- ³⁶ Ibid, p 142
- ³⁷ Ibid
- ³⁸ Ibid, p 55
- ³⁹ Ed Blanche, "Israeli Intelligence Agencies Under Fire" in *Janes Intelligence Review*, (January 1998, Vol. 10, No. 1), p 18
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, p 23
- ⁴¹ For a discussion on the corrosive effects of lying by public officials, see Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*, (New York: Vintage books, 1989), especially chapter XII: "Lying for the Public Good"
- ⁴² Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1990), p 308-310.
- ⁴³ Ibid, p 311
- ⁴⁴ Ibid
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, p 313-314
- ⁴⁶ Mark Moyer, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p 173.
- ⁴⁷ For a detailed account of fraudulent claims against Phoenix, see Moyer, p 213-219
- ⁴⁸ Valentine, p 315-326, 376-382
- ⁴⁹ Herbert, p 32
- ⁵⁰ Herbert, p 53-54
- ⁵¹ Reisman and Baker, p 143

VI. EXPANDING THE MODEL

To this point this thesis has been primarily concerned with the destruction of the target. As stated previously, there are alternatives that will have different ramifications on the impact of CLT. They include capturing and isolating the target.

A. CAPTURE OF THE TARGET

While both capture and destruction focus on the physical removal of the leader from the strategic apex, there are distinct differences between the two. First, capture is much harder to accomplish than destruction. If it is feasible to capture the leader, then it is feasible to kill him. The reverse is not true. For instance, having the means to destroy by airpower does not equate to having the means to capture. Generally, the requirements for capture are much greater.

Second, deniability is much harder to maintain with capture. While it may be plausible to state that an airstrike was targeted at the building the leader was in rather than the leader, this plausibility disappears if the only effect of the operation is the leader's capture. Attempts up until successful execution can be managed

covertly, but this form of CLT tends to negate permanent covert options.

Third, capture, unlike destruction, may not be a permanent option. The results of the CLT may be negated if the leader escapes. In 1919 the U.S. Marines deployed to Haiti to quell an insurrection led by a charismatic man named Charlemagne Peralte. In 1917 Charlemagne had been arrested for his role in the rebellion, but had managed to escape by bribing a prison guard.¹ Consequently, by 1919 Charlemagne had organized his own shadow government and was posing a serious threat to the stability of Haiti.² On October 31 1919, Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hanneken infiltrated Charlemagne's camp and killed him. The rebellion rapidly faltered without Charlemagne's leadership. Although many tried to assume his position as leader, none succeeded.³ The decision to kill Charlemagne was made because the Marines "knew that Haiti's justice system could not have handled him. Charlemagne had been captured before, only to escape and personally reinvigorate the [rebel] movement."⁴

Finally, capturing the leader may lead to future events that the CLT was designed to eliminate in the first place.

The release of imprisoned terrorists is the most frequent goal in hostage situations and the terrorists' second most important objective after

publicity. The apprehension and imprisonment of terrorist leaders make virtually certain that further acts of violence will occur. Perhaps many lives would [be] spared if [the leaders were] killed instead of captured.⁵

Even with the possibility of the above disadvantages, the capture form of CLT alters the model in ways that may favor the strategy in certain circumstances, as well produce a reduction in the risk of unintended consequences.

1. Alterations to the Model

When using the capture strategy the most notable impact on the model occurs with the succession variables. Since the captured leader is still alive, the organization is hesitant to replace him. This leads to an extension in the time needed for succession. Even organizations that have an institutionalized succession policy are likely to hesitate to implement that policy. In addition, the length of time needed for the successor to achieve legitimacy is increased, as he does not begin with a clean slate, but must compete with the captured leader for allegiance. The organization is essentially looking in two directions for guidance. This is precisely what occurred with the Shining Path after the capture of Amimail Guzman. The group was at a loss about succession. Guzman's capture

...perpetuate[s] a leadership vacuum in Shining Path because while he remains alive nobody is likely to seize the initiative too boldly. This could

produce a certain fossilization at the top of the party and a loosening of its structure below.⁶

Giving Guzman the death penalty, as the president of Peru wishes, would be a mistake. "Without Guzman, the way would be clear for a new leader to assert him or herself and to provide the party with fresh impetus and direction."⁷

Since the increase in succession time increases the length of time that the CLT effects last, it follows that the capture form of CLT is more suited to a dislocation strategy. It may not be as conducive to a replacement strategy, as the successor might be forced to fight for control of the organization with the captured leader, thus delaying the time before he can implement a change in policy. In the worst case, the successor might have to alter his vision in order to co-opt the powerbase of the organization, thus negating the benefits of the intended replacement strategy.

2. Effects on Unintended Consequences

When dealing with unintended consequences, the primary benefit of capture over destruction is that capture has a psychological effect akin to destruction, albeit possibly reduced, without the risk of creating a martyr. The capture can still destroy any myths about the "infallible leader", but will prevent the successor from using the CLT as

propaganda to increase the motivation of the organization through martyrdom. In the case of the Shining Path, Guzman's death

would convert [him] into an immensely potent martyr figure and not only galvanize his current supporters but broaden his appeal amongst the neutral.⁸

Capture is also conducive to overcoming reservations of morality in a democratic society. Generally, people have fewer reservations about capturing an opponent leader as opposed to targeting him for destruction. For instance, President Bush probably would not have been able to engender as much support for Operation Just Cause had he publicly stated that he intended to kill Noriega for his narco-trafficking. In this case, capture was necessary to facilitate public support for the operation.

B. ISOLATION OF THE TARGET

While the two previously discussed forms of CLT have focused specifically on the leader, isolation focuses on the links between the leader and the follower. As such, isolation is much broader, with a wide latitude of employment options. Generally, the links between the leader and follower can be classified as physical or psychological.

Isolation of the physical link is accomplished by affecting the leadership's mode of communication, such as

phone lines, radio transmission, etc. While generally meaning destruction, it could encompass electronic jamming or "spoofing" (replacing true communications with false ones). Physical isolation is generally reserved for state conflict, where the communication systems of the opposing organizations are clearly defined.

Physical isolation can also be a byproduct of directly targeting the leadership through destruction or capture strategies. In the Gulf War, Saddam's ability to manage the conflict was undoubtedly hampered by his need to keep on the move for survival. At one point, he was directing the campaign from a caravan of American made recreational vehicles.⁹ This could not have helped his organization's efficiency.

During Just Cause, although the political goal was a strategy of replacement, the U.S. military wanted Noriega out of the picture to prevent him from controlling PDF forces, to "decapitate the snake" in the words of one commander.¹⁰ While the Noriega chase itself was embarrassing, the constant pressure on the Panamanian leader accomplished the military's goal of dislocation. "Even as they failed to nail Noriega, his pursuers [the U.S. military] were satisfied that he was running too hard to

direct any resistance to the conventional operations of Just Cause."¹¹

Finally, during World War II the German army was stymied by partisan activity in Yugoslavia. In May of 1944 the German high command decided that "what was needed was the destruction of the brain and heart of the entire [partisan] movement. Tito, the undisputed leader of the partisans, the personification of the will to fight, had to be captured or killed."¹² To that end the Germans conducted Operation Rosselsprung. The operation itself was a failure, having succeeded in capturing only Tito's uniform and jeep, but it did cause a pause in partisan activities. By forcing Tito to move his headquarters, Operation Rosselsprung had the effect of isolating him from his partisan command.¹³

Although physical isolation has been attempted in many wars, such as Operation Benson Silk in Vietnam where American operators blanked out NVA frequencies and inserted false information,¹⁴ it wasn't until Desert Storm that it became a pillar of overall campaign strategy. In addition to the targeting of Saddam Hussein, the air campaign sought to destroy his command and control nodes to prevent him from communicating with his strategic forces.¹⁵ The results of this campaign are mixed at best, and highlight some of the problems with the physical isolation strategy.

By the end of the air campaign 580 precision and non-precision strikes were mounted against Saddam's C2 capability,¹⁶ yet sufficient connectivity still existed for Saddam to "order a withdrawal from the theater and to direct five Republican Guard divisions to screen the retreat."¹⁷ The air campaign planners were taken aback at the number and resilience of the Iraqi systems. Even after the Iraqi civilian telecommunications system was destroyed "numerous prisoner of war reports affirmed that communications from Baghdad to Kuwait were continuously available."¹⁸

As the Gulf War shows, it is difficult to physically destroy all means of communication within an organization. In addition, it is difficult to determine how effective the attacks are in isolating the leadership. Unlike destruction or capture, isolation works on a scale from complete loss of communication to no damage at all. While a captured leader offers assurance of no communication, the isolation strategy relies on damage assessments that may or may not be accurate. Thus, the initiating commander might not be able to count on the strategy as a necessary condition for success. In essence, this tends to reduce the strategy to a sideshow, as

Battle damage assessment of C2 warfare is so difficult (consisting both of what was hit and what difference the hit made) that field

commanders understandably want to see visible craters to ensure they had any effect at all."¹⁹

Even years after the conclusion of the Gulf War, there is contention about the effectiveness of the strategy. On the one hand a Department of Defense report to Congress claims that the air strikes "paralyzed Iraq's ability to direct battlefield operations"²⁰. On the other hand, the official Air Power Survey commissioned by the Air Force states:

Without access to high-level Iraqi officials and records, the degree of disruption and dislocation inflicted by strikes...cannot be quantified, not even roughly.²¹

The Friedman's, in *the Future of Warfare*, vehemently disputes this, stating that the while Baghdad had the capability to order a simple withdrawal, it didn't have the capability to manage the withdrawal, and thus didn't have the "communications capacity to wage extended offensive warfare."²² They conclude by stating:

It must be understood that for the first time in history, airpower was so effective against the lines of communication that what was, in effect, an army group was rendered immobile (bold in original).²³

Whichever side one stands on in this debate, with only one case study to pull from, it may be too early to draw specific inferences for future conflict.

Since sub-state groups will most likely use the same communication systems as their opponents, physical attack is

sometimes precluded. Another option is to attack the psychological links between the leader and follower through information operations. As shown, most sub-state leadership is not based on legal or traditional precedent, but on charisma. Since the leader is transformational, attacking the leader through psychological operations may affect his charismatic pull. The less transformational the leader, the less susceptible his constituents will be to this manipulation.

Obviously, this technique begins to blur the line between CLT and other operations. As such, it does not fit the model presented, and yet it is still useful for discussion and possible future research. For instance, in Somalia, Aidid's power lay not in a legitimate, formal position, but in the voluntary cooperation and obedience of his clan. Without clan compliance, Aidid would have faded away.²⁴ If the UN could have altered perceptions of Aidid from the outset, the overt CLT attempt by Task Force Ranger would not have been necessary. Instead of legitimizing Aidid's position by targeting him, the UN could have sought to push him to the margins through the skillful use of PSYOPS within the population. Prior to UNISOM II there was a concerted effort to do just that.

The UNITAF task force had a concentrated, integrated PSYOPs campaign designed to break the warlords' grip. UNITAF went in country prepared for information operations by creating a joint PSYOP task force of 125 personnel. This force was extremely proactive in shaping the perceptions of the Somali people. It published a daily newspaper and broadcast a daily radio program, both called raja (Somali for "hope"). The radio and newspaper were instrumental in countering inflammatory propaganda from the warlords. Aidid and other clan leaders were sensitive to the impact of both mediums, and paid attention to what was being said. In addition to using newspaper and radio, PSYOP loudspeaker teams traveled the countryside explaining the mission of UNITAF.²⁵ In the words of Ambassador Robert Oakley, then special envoy to Somalia, the synthesis of the different components of the information strategy

proved to be effective...instruments and they were critical in avoiding major confrontations with Somali factions as well as vital to our efforts at gaining popular support. The influence of Aidid['s]...radio broadcasts and pamphlets was lessened to a significant degree by the use of Raja Radio and the Raja newspaper.²⁶

When UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for the Somalia mission almost all efforts at perception management ceased. Both the newspaper and the radio stopped operating. The PSYOP task force was reduced from 125 men to eight.²⁷ As

the conflict between the SNA and the UN escalated, no attempt was made to alter the perceptions of the population against Aidid.

A man named Chuck de Caro espouses using just such a technique for war-torn Bosnia, which he calls "Soft War".²⁸ Caro proposes to break the grip of accused war criminals over the Bosnian Serb population using television. In effect, fight Serb propaganda head-on with American programming. "In the process, the warlords ... would see their grip on the citizens slipping away."²⁹

Since psychological isolation involves reverse CLT, that is removing the population from the leader instead of vice versa, it cannot be applied to the model. It is included as grist for future thought only. Physical attack, on the other hand, shows some significant positive effects for the targeting organization to consider, both with the model and the unintended consequences.

1. Alterations to the Model

Like capture, physical isolation affects the succession process. In this case, the succession is extended indefinitely. Since the leader is obviously still alive, and ostensibly still in command, the organization never sees the need to implement a succession policy. Thus, the effects continue for the duration of the isolation. Since

the need for a successor is never addressed, this form of CLT can only be used for a dislocation strategy. The isolation will never allow a replacement to come to the fore.

Physical isolation also potentially causes a greater drop in efficiency. While a leader permanently removed from an organization has an effect on efficiency, the subordinates realize he is gone and seek other avenues for information. With isolation this is not the case. The subordinate continues to attempt communications with the strategic apex instead of seeking direction elsewhere, leading to a greater loss in efficiency.

While isolation increases the length of time the effects will be felt structurally, it reduces any potential psychological effects. Since the leader is presumed to be alive and in command, the psychological effects are nullified.

2. Effects on Unintended Consequences

Physical isolation has its greatest benefits in its prevention of unintended consequences. Since the leader remains inside the strategic apex, unintended consequences are reduced:

- Since he is still alive, the martyr syndrome is eliminated.

- Since the leader has not been physically attacked, reciprocal targeting is alleviated.
- As the targets are ordinary C2 nodes, no special effort needs to be made to garner public support (outside of the public support already required for the conflict), and thus the potential effects on the targeting organization are reduced.
- Since the CLT is directed away from the leader, the psychological effects of failed attempts are alleviated.

Thus, while physical isolation may be the hardest CLT to execute successfully, due to its structural characteristics and lack of potential unintended consequences, it could prove to be the most attractive dislocation strategy.

¹ Jonathan L. Schwarz, *Direct Action in Haiti: The Assassination of Charlemagne Peralte*, (The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, unpublished paper), p 2

² Ibid, p 5

³ Ibid, p 24

⁴ Ibid, p 26

⁵ Brian Jenkins, *Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassination?*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1987), p 4

⁶ Simon Strong, *Shining Path, a Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, (United Kingdom: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), p 26

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War*, (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), p 313-314

¹⁰ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), p 76

¹¹ Ibid, p 105-106

¹² James Lucas, *Kommando: German Special Forces of World War II*, (New York: St Martins Press, 1985), p 105

¹³ Ibid, p 125

¹⁴ Charles F. Reske, *MACVSOG Command History, Annex B, Vol. II*, (Sharon Center, Ohio: Alpha Publications, 1990), p 357

¹⁵ Eliot Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p 57

¹⁶ Ibid, p 60

¹⁷ Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win*, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), p 240

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Martin Libicki, *What is Information Warfare?*, (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 1996), p 18

²⁰ Pape, p 238

²¹ Cohen, p 61

²² George and Heidi Friedman, *The Future of Warfare*, (New York: St Martin's Griffith, 1996), p 279

²³ Ibid, p 279-280

²⁴ Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, "Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations", (Office of the Secretary of Defense White Paper, 1996, (<http://sac.saic.com/SOMALIA.HTM>), p 24

²⁵ For a detailed discussion of the joint task force, see Charles Borchini and Mari Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope", *Special Warfare* 7:4 (October 1994)

²⁶ Robert Oakley and David Tucker, "Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations", (Strategic Studies Institute Symposium White Paper, 1997), p 4

²⁷ Jeffrey Jones, "The Third Wave and the Fourth Dimension" in Richard Shultz, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and W. Bradley Stock (eds.), *Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War*, (locally published volume, 1994), p 229-230

²⁸ Adams, p 287

²⁹ Ibid, p 288

VII. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

CLT can be a viable, albeit volatile, component for conflict resolution. More so than other military operations, success is predicated on prior analysis. Simply having the tactical capability to attack the target does not guarantee operational success. The characteristics of the organization as well as the leader will determine whether the strategy produces the intended results. When distilling the preceding analysis, six key sets of questions emerge:

- What is the intent of the attack? Is the goal dislocation, or replacement?
- Is the selected target in the actual strategic apex, or simply a mouthpiece/figurehead?
- Is enough organizational control and direction centered on the target to make the attack worthwhile? Or is the strategic apex large and diffuse? Does a large amount of vertical decentralization exist?
- Is there a succession policy? For replacement: how well can it be predicted? For dislocation: will the succession turmoil last long enough to accomplish the goal (short-term/long-term)?
- How united is the organization? For replacement: is there enough support behind the successor to allow him to alter the vision of the organization? For dislocation: is there potential for the organization to fragment, forcing the successor to concentrate on his survival instead of the conflict?
- Will the psychological effects work for or against the targeted organization? Will the attack be a

blow to morale, or will it create a martyr,
stiffening resistance?

These questions would seem fundamental to the analysis needed prior to embarking on a strategy of CLT. The value of these questions is not in their completeness, but in their ability to trigger further questions that focus on the specific variables that define the leverage of CLT.

The unique characteristics of the post-Cold-War world may make CLT more viable than in previous times. For instance, while this study has purposely steered clear of tactical questions, a primary block to successful CLT has been the capability (or lack thereof) to actually strike the target. Advances in information technologies, such as satellites and sensors, may greatly enhance our ability to track potential targets, thereby increasing the viability of the strategy. "Current and impending technologies could permit us to reinvent warfare, once again to attack the instigators of violence and atrocity, not the representational population who themselves have often been victimized by their leadership."¹

Post Cold War threats have changed as well. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as the single global superpower, conflict strategies are no longer determined with the opposing superpower in mind. The threat of global warfare has receded, and in its place

regional threats, such as Iraq, have risen. These threats seek hegemony within their respective regions, in the absence of a controlling superpower.

Sub-state actors have proliferated as well. These organizations, such as trans-national criminal organizations and international terrorist groups, recognize U.S. strengths, and will attempt asymmetric attacks to target perceived weaknesses. Both of these threats, in their own way, are vulnerable to CLT strategies.

A. REGIONAL THREATS

The state system that is most likely to pose a threat to regional U.S. interests will, in all probability, be some form of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime.² When analyzed against the model, these organizational structures stand out as being vulnerable to a strategy of CLT. In addition, these regime types are more vulnerable to coercive and deterrent pressure from CLT.

In order to leverage this pressure, CLT against these regional state actors should be conducted overtly. One option would be to implement a declaratory CLT policy, in effect stating that the conflict is with the leadership, and not with the country per se, much like the U.S. did (and continues to do) in Iraq. The policy would not indicate

that a conflict would inevitably lead to CLT, only that the U.S. reserves the right to execute CLT should it be deemed appropriate (i.e., the analysis of the state organization indicates a vulnerability to CLT). This is not to advocate a declaratory policy that contradicts domestic and international prohibitions, such as assassination. Rather, it is to advocate using CLT legitimately within the confines of overall strategy. In effect, the threat would be that the continued adverse actions by the regional actor would bring about conflict with the United States. As part of resolving this conflict the U.S. might legitimately execute a CLT strategy. Remember, not every leadership attack equates to assassination (see Appendix).

Thus, regional actors would be aware up front that a conflict with the U.S. could lead to their removal. This alone may coerce the regional threat without the need to commit forces.

Such a doctrine is far from original in the history of U.S. conflict. In the late 1700's a fledgling America had to deal with the so-called "Barbary Pirates" of the four Berber Muslim states - Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. These pirates would force ships in the Mediterranean to pay tribute or risk becoming captive for future blackmail tributes. While still a colony of Great Britain, America

fell under the protection of the Crown. After the war for independence, the new country of the United States fell prey to the pirates as a sovereign entity. The indignities heaped upon the U.S. included the commandeering of U.S. warships, the constant paying of "tributes", and the capturing of prisoners for further blackmail.

In 1801 the ruler of Tripoli declared war on the United States, ostensibly because he was upset with "his share of American largesse".³ President Jefferson responded by sending a Naval force to the Mediterranean for the purpose of ensuring shipping. The crisis culminated in 1803 when Tripolitan gunboats captured the warship Philadelphia, along with her crew. The crew would remain prisoners of Tripoli for eighteen months, with America attempting both military and diplomatic options to obtain their release. Finally, the crisis was resolved with coercive pressure applied through a strategy of replacement CLT.

General William Eaton, the creator of the plan and the previous Consul to Tunis, believed the only way to stop Tripoli transgressions was to dethrone the current ruler and replace him with Hamet Karamanli, the rightful heir. He secured President Jefferson's blessings for the plan, and set about forming one of the first "coalition" forces used by America. He, along with a handful of Marine officers and

privates, located Hamet and formed a motley army consisting of Arabs, Greek Christians, and "twenty-five Cannoneers, scraped from the streets of Cairo".⁴ On March 6, 1805, this force proceeded from Alexandria, Egypt, across a thousand miles of desert toward Tripoli. Forty days later, Eaton arrived on the shores of Bomba Bay, and began the march to Tripoli. Yusuf, the ruler of Tripoli, launched a pre-emptive strike against Eaton in an attempt to halt his advance. This strike was defeated, and the further defeat of Tripoli seemed assured. Unfortunately for Eaton, even as he was preparing his next move, the U.S. considered coercive diplomacy better than outright conquest. He was ordered to cease and desist because the prisoners had been released for a \$60,000 cash ransom.⁵

Thus ended the first successful American use of CLT for coercive diplomacy. Yusuf, a man who consistently thumbed his nose at the fledgling U.S. diplomatic and military attempts prior to Eaton, capitulated when Eaton posed a serious threat to his survival. Although others summed up the stopping of Eaton's force as "a sacrifice of national honor",⁶ in actuality Eaton had accomplished everything his force had set out to do. The prisoners were freed, and Tripoli never again bothered American shipping.

This author is not the first to espouse a modern declaratory policy of CLT much like William Eaton and President Jefferson chose. Others, such as Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, believe we should have

a military doctrine, recognized by government, that stated that the primary goal of any U.S. war or intervention would be to eliminate the offending leadership, its supporting cliques, and their enabling infrastructure.⁷

The danger in this approach, as described above, is a boomerang effect whereby the leadership, and not its offending policies, becomes the focus of the operation. To reduce the potential for this, the U.S. should take care not to center public support around removing the leadership. The U.S. should garner public support for the reasons behind any action taken, and not the action itself. For instance, in a dislocation strategy, the U.S. should stress that the leadership's removal is a possible endstate, not a goal. Dislocation is the goal.

A state leadership system, such as a third world dictatorship, can be susceptible to a strategy of replacement. As shown, this strategy is extremely hard to execute successfully. The successor and his views must be known prior to executing the strategy. As with Operation Just Cause, knowing the views of the successor may not be enough. It may be necessary to remove the powerbase of the

organization as well as to ensure the survival of the successor's views. Attempting a replacement strategy without analyzing the organization or the replacement is asking for failure. For instance,

It's one of history's greatest jokes that the assassination of Julius Caesar accomplished precisely what his assassins, justified in their deed by the interests of their party, were seeking by killing him to avoid: their own final destruction and the establishment of the new monarchy.⁸

Thus, a replacement strategy should only be attempted when the analysis of the organization results in a high probability of success. As with a dislocation strategy, to prevent a backlash with the public it should be stressed that replacement is the goal, not the killing or capturing of the current leadership. The risk with this is the specter of the old tyrant re-assuming control of the regional state - in some cases it might be worthwhile to make the leader the goal to ensure the long-term success of the replacement strategy.

When executing the CLT campaign, an isolation strategy can be conducted concurrently with both capture and destruction strategies, although conducting physical isolation concurrently with a replacement strategy should be avoided. The physical destruction of the communication links between the strategic apex and the members of the

state may inhibit the successor's ability to rapidly gain control, thereby delaying the positive effects of the replacement.

B. SUB-STATE THREATS

As shown, CLT can have an inordinate effect on the sub-state organization. Of course, this assumes that the leadership has been correctly targeted. Today's sub-state group is showing a willingness to network with other groups, possibly obscuring the true strategic apex of any one organization. For instance, will removing Osama Bin Laden cause that organization to disintegrate? Or will it simply cause a plethora of separate groups to resume functioning on their own? Is he the strategic apex, or simply the checkbook? Questions such as these reinforce the need for in-depth analysis.

Since the sub-state organization exists to counter the state, deterrence or replacement is usually not an option. Dislocation will be the usual intent of the CLT, and its effects can be leveraged for both short term (disrupt a specific terrorist act) or long term (destroy the functional ability of an insurgency) aims. For little cost, psychological isolation can be conducted concurrently with

the dislocation strategy. As in the case of Somali, it has potential to provide dividends with little to no risk.

While the hazards shown by the Israeli CLT in Jordan are always present, several characteristics of the sub-state organization lend it to using CLT covertly. This, combined with the legislative, judicial, and executive oversight currently in place for covert operations⁹, may allow the benefits of covert CLT while mitigating risks such as groupthink.

First, the covert approach eliminates the effects of failed missions. Without knowledge of the operation, the risk of failure enhancing the image of the sub-state target, and possibly increasing the membership of the sub-state organization, is alleviated.

Second, the covert approach allows targeting in the absence of public support. Since public support for sub-state CLT is potentially harder to gather due to asymmetric strengths, attempting to overtly legitimize the CLT may undermine the overall campaign in the eyes of the public. This is not because CLT is any less justified, just that the threat from the sub-state group is harder for the public to grasp. While the public might withhold support for a stated policy of targeting terrorist leadership, rest assured they will conduct their own CLT on the hapless organization

deemed to be responsible for failing to prevent a terrorist attack. In fact, the increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction may tend to reverse this aversion to sub-state CLT.

Due to the lack of a succession policy with the sub-state group, a capture strategy will potentially generate more leverage than a destruction strategy. While harder to accomplish, it has the added benefit of alleviating potential martyr problems.

In the end, however, it must be remembered that the intent of sub-state CLT usually will be dislocation, and that an intent of dislocation is not an end unto itself, but a means to an end. As such it does not replace classical counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism measures. It can only enhance these measures.

C. CONCLUSION

Historically, CLT has been an effective strategy in terminating conflict. Unfortunately, history has shown it may backfire as well. Before considering CLT the targeted organization should be specifically analyzed. The wide variance in organizational structures plays as great a role in determining success or failure of the strategy as the leader himself. Without a systematic analysis of the

targeted organization's characteristics it is impossible to determine if the CLT will provide useful leverage. Worse still, CLT can have effects exponentially larger than the actual operation.

While the threats facing the United States are potentially well suited to a strategy of CLT, and in fact the strategy should be included in the U.S. arsenal, attacking the opponent's leadership haphazardly is risking a failure whose impact may be felt long after the conflict subsides.

¹ Ralph Peters, "A Revolution in Military Ethics" in *Parameters*, (Vol. XXVI, No.2, Summer 1996), p 107

² Watman and Wilkening, p 27-28

³ R.E. Dupuy and W.H. Baumer, "Wars with the Barbary Pirates, 1801-1806" in John Arquilla (ed.), *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times*, (Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), p 96

⁴ Ibid, p 111

⁵ Ibid, p 113

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Peters, p 106

⁸ Herbert, p 105

⁹ For a review of the oversight in place for U.S. covert operations, see Reisman and Baker, p 116-135

APPENDIX: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES

Before discussing the ethical and legal dimensions of CLT it is necessary to re-iterate the boundaries with which this thesis is concerned. Since the killing of a foreign or military leader in an attempt to influence another nation's leadership or foreign policy during peace is generally perceived to be prohibited¹, this thesis is concerned with conflict. More precisely, the effects that CLT could have on conflict termination.

Conflict itself is ethically judged in two ways, first on the reasons why the organization is fighting, second on the means it adopts.

The first kind of judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say that the war is being fought justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the difference a matter of propositions, distinguishing *jus ad bellum*, the justice of war, from *jus in bello*, justice in war.²

For this discussion it will be assumed that the organization considering CLT is engaged in a just war (*jus ad bellum*). The ethical and legal discussion will center on fighting justly during the conflict (*jus in bello*). Specifically, given that the conflict is legal and ethical, is the strategy of targeting opponent leadership within the

conflict legal and ethical? As stated in Chapter one, it is understood that the boundary between conflict and non-conflict can grow extremely hazy, as with a "war on terrorism", but for this discussion the boundary will be used as an absolute.

A. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

When discussing the ethical dimensions of CLT and *jus in bello*, the primary question is whether the targeted leader falls within the boundaries of combatant. Can the leader ethically be targeted like an ordinary soldier? Or is there an ethical argument for sparing him? Following a paper presented by Prof. Nicholas Fotion to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, the targeting of opposing leadership depends upon two concepts: (a) the principal of discrimination, and, to a lesser extent, (b) the principal of proportionality.

The principal of discrimination, as its title alludes, is concerned with discriminating between those "who...you [can] justly shoot at, bomb, blast, beat down...or more generally attempt violence against in war"³ and those you cannot. It is primarily dependent on the degree of involvement in the war.⁴ This degree of involvement is on a continuum that can be characterized by three stages:

- Direct involvement
- Indirect involvement
- No involvement

The greater the contributions of the target to the war effort, the more direct the involvement. Unequivocal direct involvement would include infantrymen engaged in combat and fighter pilots bombing military capability. Moving down the continuum, indirect involvement includes soldiers training other soldiers to fight, scientists developing more efficient weapons, and test pilots. All of these examples are subject to just attack. At the far end are those who have no involvement in the war, and thus should be immune to attack, such as mothers raising children and farmers producing food for the nation (not specifically for the military).

While the line between involvement and non-involvement, and thus combatant and non-combatant, can be divided into a million shades of gray (the mother is raising future soldiers, a fraction of the farmer's food goes to the military), our purpose is to focus on the leadership. To that end, if the leadership of the organization engaged in conflict "is such that they spend a major portion of their time working in support of the war effort, they should be seen as out of uniform members of the military. They too

can be legitimately targeted."⁵ Thus, there is no ethical quandary when targeting a leader contributing to the effort of the conflict. This dovetails neatly with the model presented, as a leader not contributing to the conflict is a poor target choice anyway, constituting a waste of resources and effort.

The principal of proportionality refers to the military act in question giving "the best balance of benefit over harm".⁶ Clearly, when proportionality is used as a criterion, CLT passes. Assuming that the conflict will be prosecuted with or without CLT, if the attack of one target vice several will help bring about conflict resolution, it is proportionally ethical. Yet we seem to have some dilemma with this notion. In the Gulf War, it was unthinkable to objectively state that Saddam was a target. The Air Force Chief of Staff was fired for just that. Instead we killed countless Iraqis in preparation for the ground war. "Why is it acceptable to slaughter...the commanded masses but not mortally punish the guiltiest individual, the commander?"⁷

Finally, I would submit that in order for the targeting to be ethical, it must have at its heart the intent of facilitating the termination of the conflict. Targeting for reprisals or revenge would be unethical regardless of the outcome. While philosophical constructs from Immanuel

Kant's categorical imperative to John Stuart Mills' utilitarianism have debated the ethics of intent versus outcome, in armed conflict, where the very nature of the activity begins a moral decay, there is no room for hindsight. This is why a soldier is guilty of war crimes for intentionally killing non-combatants, while a pilot is absolved of a crime should his bombs miss the target and do the same. The outcomes of these two events are identical: dead non-combatants. The difference is the intent: one intended to kill non-combatants, the other did not. CLT, like any other military targeting, must be used as an extension of the military strategy. To target for any other reason, such as revenge or punishment, moves CLT out of the realm of strategy and into the realm of personal vendetta, flaunting the very notions of justice this country was founded upon. It does not matter if the attack coincidentally helps with conflict termination, if the intent of the targeting is other than to enhance the prospects of conflict termination, it is ethically wrong.

In summary, if the leadership of the opponent meets the above criteria for discrimination and proportionality, and the targeting is done with the intent of resolving the conflict, then it is ethical to pursue a course of CLT. I would submit that it is not only ethical, but, if the non-

targeting results in friendly and enemy casualties, casualties that could have been avoided by CLT, it is unethical to do otherwise.

To argue as a matter of moral principle that, above all and without possible exception, the life of a head of state guilty of armed aggression must be safeguarded - to give him the protected status of a Red Cross or Medical Worker - is to argue that it is better to kill 10,000 innocent individuals than to take the life of one guilty man.⁸

B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Legal obstacles to CLT generally take the form of prohibitions against assassination. These prohibitions are both international and domestic.

1. International Prohibitions: Article 23 of the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907

Interestingly enough, assassination is not specifically prohibited in any international treaty or convention governing armed conflict. Article 23 of the Hague Convention, in which it is forbidden "to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army", is generally considered to prohibit assassination.⁹ The key to the international legal context is not *who* is targeted, but the *method* of targeting. It is not illegal to specifically target opponent leadership, provided they fall into the category of combatant. It is only illegal to

attack them "treacherously". Treacherous attack is seen as the "assumption of false character, whereby the person assuming it deceives his enemy and so is able to commit a hostile act, which he could not have done had he avoided the false pretenses."¹⁰ Thus, attacking in the guise of a non-combatant, such as a member of the Red Cross, would be illegal, no matter who was the target.

The distinction between the method of attack and the target is crucial, as it delineates what the law was designed to protect. "The object to be protected is not the targeted adversary, but rather the safety of the civilian population and, more generally, continued confidence in law and international agreement."¹¹ The prohibition is designed to prevent adversaries from taking advantage of the immunity of select groups, and thus prevent reprisals to those groups and a subsequent loss of immunity. For instance, if someone disguised as a member of the Red Cross were allowed to attack an opponent, the opponent would most likely begin to target legitimate Red Cross workers.

Seen in this light, CLT in and of itself is legal by international conventions and treaties. Nothing specifically prevents targeting opponent leadership during conflict other than the prohibitions already in place,

prohibitions which define the illegal targeting of any opponent, leader or otherwise.

2. Domestic Prohibitions: Executive Order 12333

In November 1975, the U.S. Senate investigated alleged assassination plots having U.S. involvement. The committee, known as the Church Committee, found U.S. involvement in five assassination attempts since 1960.¹² At the conclusion of the investigation, the committee recommended legislation banning assassination. Although there were three different proposals placed before Congress, the legislation was never passed.

Seeing that Congress was unwilling to act, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 11905, which read in part "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."¹³ This prohibition is now embodied in Executive Order 12333, signed by every president since President Carter. Unfortunately, the term assassination was never defined. Some say this was done intentionally to allow leeway for action. What has actually occurred is the opposite. Anything smacking of assassination involves immediate termination of the operation.

To resolve the issue the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General created a Memorandum of Law dealing with Executive Order 12333, assassination, and conflict. It concludes

That the clandestine, low visibility or overt use of military force against legitimate targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace where such individuals or groups pose an immediate threat to United States citizens or the national security of the United States, as determined by competent authority, does not constitute assassination or conspiracy to engage in assassination, and would not be prohibited by the proscription in EO 12333 or by international law.¹⁴

Like other discussions, the memorandum spends a great deal of time determining the definition of a "legitimate target". It breaks the principle of discrimination into four categories:

- Military operations: specific attacks or defense
- Military effort: all activities by civilians which objectively are useful in defense or attack in the military sense
- War effort: all national activities, which by their nature and purpose contribute to military victory
- Non-participation

While, in a decidedly lawyerly fashion, the memorandum bounces around the issue of the actual cut line between combatant and non-combatant ("Those who do not participate are always immune from intentional attack...[but] there is no

agreement as to the degree of participation necessary to make an individual civilian a combatant...and no existing law of war treaty provides clarification or assistance..."¹⁵), Appendix B specifically excludes leadership from the non-participation category, placing the state leadership in the war effort category, and the sub-state leadership in the military effort category.

The memorandum not only allows attacks on state leadership during periods of conventional war, but also allows CLT during periods of unconventional conflict. It explicitly states that EO 12333 does not preclude attacks against terrorist or insurgency leadership that pose an "immediate threat to United States citizens."

A national decision to employ military force in self defense against a legitimate terrorist or related threat would not be unlike the employment of force in response to a threat by conventional forces; only the nature of the threat has changed, rather than the international legal right of self defense.¹⁶

This is in agreement with the original draft legislation proposed by the Church committee. In creating the draft legislation, the Church Committee specifically excluded conflict situations, stating that assassination would be prohibited against a foreign country "with which the United States *was not at war* pursuant to a declaration war, or *engaged in hostilities* pursuant to the War Powers

Resolution."¹⁷ Senator Church himself stated he was "not talking about Adolf Hitler or anything of that character."¹⁸

Thus, EO 12333 does not prohibit, nor was it intended to prohibit, attacks on opponent leadership during times of conflict. Like the ethical question, if the CLT is applied against a legitimate target with an intent of favorably impacting the resolution of the conflict, be it stopping a specific terrorist WMD threat or halting a regional power's general aggression, then it is not contrary to the prohibitions outlined in EO 12333.

¹ Patricia Zengel, "Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict", in *Military Law Review*, (volume 134, Fall 1991), p 125

² Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars, Second Edition*, (New York: BasicBooks, 1992), p 21

³ Nicholas Fotion, "Who, What, When, and How to Attack", (unpublished paper presented to the JSCOPE XVII conference, 1996), p 1

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, p 2

⁶ Ibid, p 6

⁷ Peters, p 104

⁸ Bruce A. Ross, "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War", in *Naval War College Review*, (Volume XLVI, number 1, sequence 341, Winter, 1993), p 84

⁹ Zengel, p 132

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ibid, p 140

¹² Ibid, p 141

¹³ Ibid, p 144

¹⁴ W. Hays Parks, "Memorandum of Law: EO 12333 and Assassination" reprinted in *The Army Lawyer: DA PAM 27-50-204*, (December, 1989), p 4

¹⁵ Ibid, p 6

¹⁶ Ibid, p 7

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Reisman and Baker, p 69

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